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*The Department of State*

# bulletin

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March 31, 1952

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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## The Overt International Information and Educational Exchange Programs of the United States

by *Howland H. Sargeant*  
*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*

Recently I heard a speaker say that "no one any longer questions the importance of this Government's International Information and Educational Exchange Program; no one any longer says that ideas are not as important as bullets." I am sorry to say that this is not an accurate statement. Plenty of people today, both in this country and other countries, confess to their belief that the only possible outcome of the cold war is a hot war in which the test for victory will be which nation or which group of nations will produce the fastest airplanes, the most efficient bazookas, the most maneuverable and hard-hitting tanks and that expenditures on such frippery as propaganda are largely wasted.

Although I do not agree with their conclusion I want to make it clear that I regard propaganda as only one of four major instruments to support the attainment of our national policy objectives whether we are in peace or war. Propaganda alone is no substitute either for policy or for action. It must be used in concert with the other major instruments of national policy—political, economic, and military power. Propaganda is 90 percent deeds and only 10 percent words. If we do the right things and make them known to others in an intelligent way, we succeed in our propaganda task. For example, we could shout for many weeks in every medium of mass communication that we use that we intend to stay in Berlin until the danger of aggression from the East is checked and until the German people have the opportunity freely to determine the kind of government and the kind of unification they may want. All this will mean little, however, as long as the words are unaccompanied by deeds. When we mount in the face of a Soviet blockade of Berlin an airlift which sets a plane down every 3 minutes on Tempelhof Airdrome, and we show the capacity to supply the people of the city of Berlin with the necessities of living to an extent even greater than when the city was supplied by rail and surface transport, then we have developed a mighty propaganda symbol to all the world. Similarly, appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, was a propaganda symbol. He stood above all

for victory in Europe and inspired a feeling of renewed confidence and determination among the peoples of Western Europe that Soviet aggression might be prevented—or, if it occurred, could be successfully resisted.

There is another dangerous fallacy abroad which I shall mention. I find that many people regard Soviet propaganda as invincible, infallible, and all-conquering. Soviet propaganda is apparently effective in many circumstances. I believe, however, that Soviet propaganda has serious fundamental weaknesses which are capable of being exploited by the free world. I believe this in spite of the fact that in the fifteenth century Louis XI of France proclaimed the simple doctrine that "if they lie to you, you lie still more to them" and George Orwell in his frightening picture of the totalitarian state of 1984 shows a ministry of truth on whose vast white façade stretch these slogans: "War is Peace; Freedom is Slavery; Ignorance is Strength." Yet one of the most vulnerable points is the demonstrable contradiction between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. This contradiction, evident even to the peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellites, is accentuated by blunders that the so-called infallible Soviet propaganda machine makes from time to time—and, to take a phrase from the late Mayor LaGuardia, "When they really pull a boner, it is a beauty."

For example: Despite their most valiant efforts to convince the world that the United States and the Republic of Korea are the aggressors in Korea, the Soviet propaganda machine has failed in its task. Most of the peoples in the world don't believe them. When Mr. Vyshinsky at the General Assembly rejected the disarmament proposals of the Western Powers with the statement that he had lain awake all night laughing at these proposals, the Kremlin belatedly realized that a propaganda blunder of the first magnitude had been made. In Italy and other Western European countries, pictures appeared of Mr. Vyshinsky emphasizing his laughter over the disarmament proposals and asking the question: "Does Mr. Vyshinsky speak for you?" All the doves and peace rallies the Communists can muster will not completely erase that picture.



Against this background I should like to sketch the following broad topics (1) The development of an overseas information program; (2) the recent reorganization of that program; (3) the scope of the program; (4) the content of the program; (5) the results we are getting; and (6) some special problems of United States propaganda in the future.

#### **Development of the Program**

In briefest compass, the U.S. Government did not become interested in any kind of international information and educational exchange program before the years immediately prior to World War II. Beginnings of what we call educational exchange and cultural relations were made in 1938 and underwent a vast wartime expansion under both the Nelson Rockefeller operation (the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) and the Office of War Information (OWI). Even before that period, we as a nation had used propaganda from time to time as one of the basic instruments of our national policy and strategy. More than 30 years ago, for example, during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson understood the power of persuasion. He correctly estimated the force of ideas and his Fourteen Points became a powerful weapon for the Allies and a major factor in the surrender of Germany. His "conditions of a just peace" reached the people behind the enemy lines and undermined their will to resist. They gained for America a position of world leadership. Of course, between the wars we promptly forgot most of these lessons we had learned, and in the Second World War we again had to discover the importance of ideas. We improvised a psychological warfare mechanism which achieved some success—both tactical and strategic. At the end of World War II, we did remember some of the lessons and salvaged some of the equipment of propaganda.

What happened was that in August 1945 the President by Executive order turned over to the State Department many of the functions, personnel, resources, and funds of OWI, Office of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Strategic Services, and Foreign Economic Administration. Those which related to the propaganda and educational exchange functions were consolidated under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, William Benton, now junior Senator from Connecticut, who was invited by Secretary Byrnes to take over the hard task of cutting down a wartime information program to peacetime proportions. Incidentally, in that process Mr. Benton was to try to find out just what the job was for the U.S. Government in time of peace, using these instruments of persuasion which we had developed. In a period of about 3 months, Mr. Benton cut personnel of somewhat over 10,000 back to roughly 3,000. He lost almost every one of his top wartime administrators who had been drawn from the highest levels of the

private mass communications business. He met considerable ignorance and apathy as to any need for continuing such an instrument of international persuasion.

From the end of the war until January 1948 the issue was in doubt whether in fact the Congress would appropriate money to sustain any kind of peacetime information program. One of the great tributes that history should pay to Senator Benton is that he saw the issue clearly and he fought it through to a successful result, culminating in the passage in January 1948 of what is now known as the International Information and Educational Exchange Act sponsored by Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator (then Congressman) Karl Mundt which authorized a permanent program of this kind. However, I want to point out that this legislation concentrated primarily on authorizing the creation of better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the peoples of other countries and on presenting "a full and fair picture of the United States" to other peoples of the world.

From January 1948 until April 1950, the program experienced heavy going and drastic-fund reductions. During this period of time, however, a considerable amount of progress was made.

On April 20, 1950, the President called for that all-out expansion of these efforts which he styled the "Campaign of Truth." He said at that time: "Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people who are uninformed, or misinformed, or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent in reaching peoples of other countries, whatever their educational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength, happiness, and peace. The task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed strength or economic aid. The Marshall Plan, military aid, Point Four—these and other programs depend for their success on the understanding and support of our own citizens and those of other countries."

#### **Organization and Function of the Program**

Reduced to its essentials the reorganization announced late in January<sup>1</sup> is an attempt to give the Administrator of the world-wide Information and Educational Exchange Programs all the tools he needs to do his job and the administrative flexibility which will be required. It also lifts the status of the whole program since the new administrator, a distinguished economist, businessman, and more recently, college president, Wilson Compton, reports directly to the Secretary and

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 151.



Under Secretary of State. He is no longer responsible in his operations to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs who, under the earlier concepts, was not only responsible for determining information policy but was also ultimately responsible for the operations of the program itself.

Under the reorganization the Assistant Secretary can become far more a staff officer of the Secretary and other top officers of the Department. He is relieved of any necessity for participation in operating decisions of the new International Information Administration (IIA); he retains the responsibility for seeing that the information policy pursued by the IIA is in line with foreign policy objectives and current foreign policy decisions.

The Administrator of the IIA gains under the reorganization a consolidation of authority in his own hands which in the past was somewhat divided between the General Manager of the program, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the regional bureaus, and the central administrative offices of the Department. The Administrator now takes the responsibility for the supervision of the planning and conduct of all the overseas aspects of these programs—a job formerly performed by the Department's regional bureaus. He also acquires considerably greater flexibility in handling the mechanics of his administration.

#### The Scope of the International Program

We shall know how good our reorganization is only after we have actually got it working. I should like, though, to give an indication of what this program includes: In the fiscal year 1948 around 2,500 people participated in the program that operated on a budget of approximately 20 million dollars. This was the low point of the program in the postwar years. We were forced to close down a number of our overseas posts and fire a number of skilled and experienced people in the very year in which the Marshall Plan was getting under way in Europe and the Soviet propaganda campaign against us was really beginning to roll. Since 1948, however, we have been building up again. The supplemental appropriation of 79 million dollars we received in the fall of 1950 following the President's call for a greatly expanded Campaign of Truth resulted in an operation with four times as many people on board as in the lean year 1948—and with nearly six times as much money. Our current strength is slightly under 12,000 people, at home and abroad, and our appropriation for 1952 is \$85,000,000.

The program consists of three primary fast media—radio, press and publications, and motion pictures—and two of what are usually called “slow media” but what I prefer to call deep penetration media—information centers and exchange programs.

Most important of all are the people overseas on the firing line itself who constitute USIE—the United States Information Service.

**Radio.** The world-wide radio network of the Voice of America transmits programs in 46 languages around the clock and has a potential foreign listening audience of some 300,000,000 people. It operates 38 domestic shortwave transmitters with overseas relay bases at Honolulu, Manila, Munich, Tangier, and Salonika plus use of BBC relays at Wooferton, England. Soviet jamming of programs to the U.S.S.R. and the Iron Curtain areas began in the spring of 1949 and became increasingly severe. We have taken major steps to overcome jamming, including such spectacular developments as the recent commissioning of the first of our high-powered floating transmitters—which was formally inaugurated at Washington on March 4.

Radio, of course, is our primary means of hammering holes through the Iron Curtain to carry messages of truth to those peoples. Despite operation of at least 250 sky-wave jamming installations and at least 1,000 ground-wave jammers, our latest monitoring reports indicate a level of understandable reception of 25 percent inside Moscow and Leningrad, and between 75 and 80 percent in many outlying areas. We have relays over the local stations of various countries including such important ones as France, Italy, Korea, Greece, Austria, Germany, and a number of the Latin American countries.

#### PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS

We use the news to get facts across in a number of ways. A 9,000-word daily wireless bulletin supplies U.S. information officers in 67 U.S. diplomatic missions with official news and background material designed for local use abroad. By air-mail and pouch the press branch supplies 170 points all over the world with a weekly air bulletin covering a number of short topics designed for the local press abroad. We do a major job in a steadily expanding publications operation including publication of more than 60 million copies of magazines, cartoon books, photo pamphlets, leaflets, and educational materials in 30 languages. Best known is *Amerika*, the big handsome slick-

**USIE Personnel and Appropriations, 1947 to 1952**

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952
Authorized Personnel . . .			4, 118	6, 030	10, 807	11, 566
Appropriation Amount . . .	\$24, 659, 778	\$20, 730, 000	\$31, 180, 900	\$47, 300, 000	\$121, 301, 789	\$85, 000, 000

paper illustrated monthly about this country printed in Russian of which around 20,000 copies continue to be distributed in the Soviet Union despite Soviet obstructionist tactics. We do a major job with visual materials, including news and feature photos, wall posters, and plastic plates for use in newspapers abroad. Regional production centers at London and Manila speed up the work.

#### **MOTION PICTURES**

Through documentary motion pictures shown in more than 90 countries we are reaching audiences of more than 1 million people everyday. They are produced with sound tracks in over 30 languages and are shown to a wide variety of rural as well as urban groups, including churches, labor organizations, youth groups, and primary and secondary schools. Newsreels are used for very current and immediate hard-hitting topical material. "Eisenhower" and "A Plan for Peace" are examples of fast use for maximum impact.

#### **OVERSEAS INFORMATION CENTERS**

One hundred and forty-six U.S. Information Centers and 31 binational centers in 78 countries throughout the world are distributing American books, newspapers, and magazines, reaching additional millions. I often think of these centers as the arsenals of ideas for the freedom-loving and prodemocratic individuals in many of these countries. Last year these centers recorded more than 24 million visits from foreign nationals. There are more than 1 million books, periodicals, Government publications, and printed materials in these centers. In addition to library services, the centers carry on cultural and educational activities, including English-language teaching in many places.

#### **EXCHANGE OF PERSONS PROGRAMS**

One of the ways to straighten people out about the facts is to let them see for themselves. Government grants enable teachers, research scholars, labor leaders, newspaper publishers, editors, and reporters to come here to see what we are like. Similar grants permit Americans to travel abroad. During fiscal 1951 more than 7,500 persons received grants-in-aid for exchanges between the United States and 71 foreign countries. Our emphasis in these exchange programs is more and more on leaders, molders, and communicators of opinion.

#### **USIE ITSELF**

Approximately 850 American officers operate at 175 foreign-service posts in 84 countries and territories, ably and devotedly assisted by 4,000 local

employees. This inventory to be complete should also include the information officers and their staffs at Paris and the Marshall Plan countries who operated under the Economic Cooperation Administration (now the Mutual Security Agency). It should also list the information activities conducted by the military services in Japan and Austria and the psychological warfare program in Korea today.

#### **The Content of the Program**

This has been simply a bare-bones inventory of the facilities and media that we are using. The content of our output is, of course, the real test of the job that we are doing. The content—what we have to say—in the long run cannot be superior to the actions and decisions taken by the free nations themselves. The policies and actions of the American Government and the behavior of the American people constitute the hard core of any content or any message that we may carry through our different media. I am often asked what it is we are trying to say in our output.

To put it very briefly, we are trying to make people believe

(1) That Soviet communism is not the progressive revolutionary movement it pretends to be but a reactionary conspiracy that would, if it succeeded, re-create the Dark Ages.

(2) That the "true revolution" in human affairs is the inevitable spread of freedom and the equitable distribution of the spiritual and material benefits of freedom.

(3) That while this "true revolution" will inevitably triumph, it will triumph in our lifetime only if all peoples resolutely and cooperatively resist the Communist conspiracy.

(4) That the United States, which since 1776 has given this "true revolution" its greatest impetus, is a strong, determined, and enlightened power which champions this concept of freedom not only for its own people but for all peoples.

(5) That it is in the self-interest of all peoples to cooperate with the United States in pursuit of this common goal.

(6) That this cooperation is gradually, often painfully, materializing, with a consequent increase in unity, confidence, and determination.

Are we making progress in the achievement of our objectives?

I can state categorically that we are. America's message is getting across, and it is getting results. At the same time, however, I want to stress the fact that there is no such thing as a clear-cut, black-versus-white test of progress. There are too many intangibles. It is exceedingly difficult to measure the opinions and reactions of our own countrymen. It is a good deal more difficult to do the same for peoples of other countries and other cultures.

We do have a number of concrete indications of

our effectiveness. And those indications are steadily increasing.

#### AUDIENCE REACTION

Take the question of audience mail. The Voice of America alone—our radio operation—gets an average of a thousand letters a day. Mail has increased three-fold since 1949. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the letters we receive either give us a pat on the back and urge us to expand our efforts or urgently request a copy of our program schedule booklet. In 1951, we sent out almost six million schedule booklets (5,751,529).

A lot of these audience letters come by air mail from such faraway places as India, where airmail stamps are a pretty expensive proposition.

In crucial pressure areas—areas where the free world and the Soviet sphere are in immediate contact—considerable progress has been made in building up our audience at Soviet expense. For example, in West Berlin, once the exclusive preserve of Soviet radio, 98 percent of the radio listeners are regular Voice of America patrons. One out of every 25 Swedish radio listeners tunes in on the Voice regularly.

Our record behind the Iron Curtain is real cause for confidence. Nine out of every 10 radio listeners in the Soviet zone of Germany listen to our radio broadcasts.

At Naples, a woman recently sewed together a ticket for a showing of an American film—a ticket which her pro-Communist husband had ripped to shreds.

At Helsinki, Finland, one of our films was shown in competition with an important Communist party meeting. Several party functionaries preferred to see the movie rather than attend the meeting.

In Yugoslavia, a film in which President Truman defines American foreign policy has been borrowed twice by the central committee of the Communist Party.

In Burma (Kachin), the people have gone to great lengths to get our films to their villages. Often, our trucks are stopped by the dense undergrowth. The villagers have then volunteered to carry heavy movie projectors, generators, and other equipment on poles slung over their shoulders.

#### PRESS CAMPAIGN

Our record in the press-materials field indicates a good measure of progress as well.

A specific example of how a well-thought-out press campaign can get concrete results comes to us from Italy, where our people made excellent use of the twelfth anniversary of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. We distributed a series of feature articles on the pact well in advance. When the anniversary arrived, virtually

every non-Communist paper in the country carried something on the treaty.

What efforts are being made to prevent our messages from reaching the audience?

An important measure of the effectiveness of our over-all informational program lies in the lengths to which the Communists have been going to insulate the peoples under their control against our propaganda. Some of the things being done to keep the people behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains from seeing, hearing, or reading our informational materials are almost inconceivable.

The Soviet Union has been engaged in a tremendous jamming campaign ever since the Voice of America began broadcasting. The Soviets now have over 2,000 stations engaged in nothing but jamming—in trying to keep us from being heard. Between 5,000 and 10,000 technicians man these jamming stations.

We are told that the Soviets and their satellites spend almost as much on jamming as we do on our entire international radio program.

The so-called “defense of peace” law enacted in virtually all satellite countries is another means toward the same end—keeping America from putting its case before the enslaved peoples. Coercion is the underlying theme here. The Czech “defense of peace” law of December 1950 is typical of such gag laws. It subjects a person caught spreading “warmongering news or propaganda by word of mouth” to from 1 to 10 years in prison. Deciphering the Communist double talk, that law means that any person caught repeating what he hears over the Voice of America or the BBC, or what he reads in a non-Communist publication, can be summarily jailed.

The licensing and taxation of all persons in possession of radio equipment are common practices in the Soviet satellite areas. In Albania, among other places, every known possessor of a radio is under constant scrutiny.

Recently, the Communists have taken to turning off the electric current in towns and villages during the hours when American broadcasts are coming through. We have had such reports from Bulgaria and Lithuania among other places.

Perhaps one of the best evidences of our effectiveness lies in the frenzied tirades against our informational media which appear in the Communist press and in speeches by Communist leaders. Few weeks pass in which *Pravda* does not complain about the Voice of America or seek to impress its readers with the “fact” that lending ear to our efforts is a most dangerous and unpatriotic practice.

#### DEFECTORS

One of our best sources of information as to how people behind the Iron Curtain are reacting is the defector. And there has been a flood of defectors from Soviet-controlled Europe during the past



several years. We recognize, of course, that the average defector is under great emotional strain and that many tend to overstate their case.

But we have checked the stories of defectors very closely. Further, we have discovered that a considerable area of agreement exists among the many accounts which we have received from such people.

We have learned, among other things, that a great percentage of the soldiers of the Red army in Soviet-controlled Germany listen to our broadcasts. We have learned that even the political commissars—the officers charged with seeing to it that the soldiers are properly oriented—listen to the Voice.

We have learned that it is becoming an increasingly common practice to scrawl the wave-lengths of American broadcasts across fences and on sidewalks in the Baltic and other Sovietized areas.

#### COMMERCIAL SURVEYS

In France we made surveys in 1948 and in 1950 by the Gallup poll affiliates. We found in those years that our audience has increased in France from 16 to 24 percent of the adult population of the country; that there are 7,000,000 people in France who listen to the Voice of America at least occasionally; and that every weekday we can expect an audience of 1,000,000 people which expands to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 people every Sunday. Half of the adult population of France has heard of the Voice of America programs. Our problem, we know from that survey, is to get more and more of them coming to their receivers.

The analysis of the audience shows that, generally speaking, our listeners include a high proportion of the better educated and urban residents.

In Germany, public opinion surveys made under the supervision of the High Commissioner's office show that in the same couple of years we have increased our audience in the U.S. zone of Germany from 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 people.

The same sort of survey showed us that in Sweden we have an occasional audience for our English-language program of 15 percent of the total population, over 700,000 people, and that we have a regular audience for our English-language program of about 100,000, who are weighted on the side of public opinion leaders and of youths.

#### Special Problems of U.S. Propaganda in the Future

I have taken you on a rapid and cursory inspection of what we are doing in the Campaign of Truth. A more leisurely and thorough survey would include more details on such subjects as the building up of an integrated organization at the highest levels of Government (the Psychological Strategy Board) for the coordination of our psychological strategy and the complementary work

of the Psychological Operations Committee for the coordination of our overseas information operations; it would include some remarks on what we are doing in the research and planning fields.

Above all, no one of us is fooled into thinking that the job being done by the Government's International Information Administration—or by all agencies of Government combined—constitutes more than a fraction of the impact of the United States and the American people on peoples abroad. We know that there are many voices of America—the GI abroad in his attitude and daily conduct, the tourist, the businessman, the American newspapers, magazines, and motion pictures, the statements of the President and of congressional leaders—all of these and many more are the voices of America.

One of the most significant developments of the past 2 years has been the increasing cooperation of private enterprise in this country in every form and variety with the overseas information programs of the Government. We have a special staff exclusively devoted to working with private enterprise which has been forced, because of the great expansion of its activity, to open offices not only at Washington and New York but at San Francisco, New Orleans, Houston, Chicago, and other points in the United States. What kind of things do they help stimulate and develop? Publishers of various American magazines have agreed that their overseas newsstand returns be given without cost to USIE offices abroad for appropriate distribution; the "letters from America" campaign sponsored by the Common Council for American Unity; affiliations between towns and cities in the United States and their counterparts abroad; encouraging private production of a leaflet to be placed in the hands of all Americans traveling abroad with some Do's and Don'ts; helping to see that positive and affirmative content is included in advertising campaigns conducted abroad by American firms; bringing newspaper editors and reporters to this country to work on American papers for short periods, etc.

Of course I should mention a very important project of private enterprise—Radio Free Europe. The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe (RFE) are two members of the great free-world team that is fighting Soviet imperialism on the side of personal and national freedom throughout the world. Radio Free Europe, financed by private citizens through individual contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, is an enterprise concentrating on the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is a citizen's station over which Poles are able to speak to Poles, Hungarians to Hungarians, etc. They speak as "The Voice of Free Poland," "The Voice of Free Hungary," and so on. They look at their peoples' problems through their own eyes.

In contrast the Voice of America is a world-wide network financed by U.S. Government funds and speaking for the U.S. Government and the American people. It sees world problems largely through American eyes. It is the only American voice heard in the Soviet Union and in many other parts of the globe. In the area behind the Iron Curtain, in which both VOA and RFE operate, their aims are essentially the same: to keep alive the hope of liberation; to let listeners know that they have not been forgotten; to stiffen their resistance against their Communist oppressors; to expose the lies of their oppressors and the unworkability of communism. Both expose the fraudulent basis of authority on which the Moscow-dominated regimes rest. Both combat communism and the persecution of religion and denial of human rights. Both report the superior industrial power and fighting potential of the free world over the Soviet enslaved world.

VOA, which has responsibility for full reporting of official American acts and documents, American news, and world developments, cannot devote the major part of its Iron Curtain broadcasts to events inside those countries. RFE, giving less time to events outside those countries, specializes in three types of broadcasts. (1) RFE reports back all truth that can be learned about what is going on in the listeners' own country; (2) RFE spreads fear in the ranks of the Communist officials of the regime by denouncing and threatening with retri-

bution all evil doers about whom it can obtain accurate information, including reports on dissolute private life and instances of personal cruelty and criminal acts; (3) RFE weans Communist youth workers and intellectuals from allegiance to the Moscow-dominated regime.

I was interested to see that Gordon Dean, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is quoted as saying in a recent interview that he regards the job he and his colleagues are doing as "the second most important task in the world that we have here at the Commission. The first, I think, is somehow or other to pierce the Iron Curtain and let the ordinary Russian know our real, and peaceful intentions."

Mr. Dean's remarks fit rather interestingly with the statement made by General Eisenhower in July 1950 in his testimony on Senate Resolution 243 when he said that "Truth, in my opinion, could almost be classified as our T-bomb, if you want to call it that, in this warfare. . . . It is a terrific responsibility to decide how much to do, where it would be better to divert a dollar into a tank, and where it is better to put a dollar into this information effort. But I am quite certain of one thing: that you could find no soldier, no man of experience in the business of fighting, . . . who would decry for one second the importance of morale, and if you do not have morale you know you cannot win. There is just not enough to win without morale. I believe that can be done by truth."

## **"Courier" To Pay Good Will Visits to Latin America**

The Voice of America's seagoing radio broadcasting station, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter, *Courier*, will pay good will visits to several Latin American countries during its forthcoming shake-down cruise in the Caribbean.

The *Courier* is scheduled to sail from Norfolk, Va., on about March 20 and arrive at La Guaira, Venezuela, March 27; Cartagena, Colombia, on April 1; and Panama City, Panama, on April 5. At each of the ports of call, broadcasts will be arranged in cooperation with local radio stations to demonstrate the operation of the floating transmitter.

The 5,800-ton, 338-foot vessel, which was dedicated in Washington, March 4, by President Truman,<sup>1</sup> will remain in the Caribbean area for several weeks for thorough testing of the transmitting equipment.

The transmitting equipment on the *Courier* is the most powerful of its kind ever installed on a ship. It consists of one 150,000 watt medium-wave transmitter—three times the power of the

largest American broadcasting station—two 35,000 watt short-wave transmitters and supporting communications equipment. The floating transmitter is designed to enable the Voice of America to cover areas beyond the reach of present broadcasts and to assist in overcoming Soviet jamming.

## **RIAS Begins 24-Hour Service**

The Department of State announced on March 21 that RIAS, the American radio station in Berlin, has inaugurated round-the-clock programming in order to offset the five stations of the Communist radio network in the Soviet zone of Germany which have developed an all-night schedule.

RIAS previously broadcast on a 22-hour a day schedule, going off the air from 3 to 5 a. m. for transmitter servicing. By activating the subsidiary transmitter at Hof, Bavaria, and by the use of RIAS' short-wave and wired transmitting facilities, full 24-hours a day service now is offered to listeners in Berlin and the Soviet zone.

During the 2 hours of added time, 5-minute newscasts are repeated several times in addition to portions of RIAS' normal programs.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 421.

## Japan: Asset of the Free World

*by Ambassador William J. Sebald*

*Political Adviser to Supreme Commander Allied Powers (Japan)*<sup>1</sup>

Tonight I would like to talk a little about Japan—about the momentous changes that have taken place there and about the important influence a free and independent Japan will have on our foreign relations in the Far East. The fact that the Senate has just approved the Treaty of Peace with Japan, together with three related security agreements in the Pacific area, has turned the spotlight on Japan and on these constructive steps in the rebuilding of the fabric of peace in the Far East.

My present assignment in Japan is of twofold character. In one capacity I am serving as the representative of the Department of State as the Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and in my other capacity I am serving as Chief of the Diplomatic Section of the Supreme Commander's General Headquarters. In these two offices it has been my privilege to have been closely associated with the unique work of the Allied Occupation of Japan almost throughout its length.

It might be well if I reviewed briefly for you the circumstances which brought about this Occupation. When the aggressive, militarist Japan we formerly knew finally went down to defeat in August 1945, it was more than a military defeat alone. The entire political, economic, and social structure of the country had been brought to the verge of complete collapse under the impact of the great sea, air, and land offensive the United States had built up against the Japanese armed forces. When the day of unconditional surrender came aboard the battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945, Japan was not only militarily defeated but was in almost complete ruin, its cities leveled by air attacks, its economy exhausted by the strain of war and consequent privations, and the morale of its people shattered after the first defeat in Japan's modern history. It was a day when time-honored institutions and traditions were being swept away in the torrent of despair and disillusionment which came with unconditional surrender.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the Knights of Columbus at Baltimore, Md., on Mar. 23 and released to the press on the same date.

At this point the Allied forces moved into a crushed and disillusioned Japan to begin the military occupation of the country. It may sometimes be asked if it was really necessary to occupy Japan after the threat of Japanese aggression had been so completely smashed. Would it not have been simpler to have regarded Japan's defeat as a good job well done and to have left the Japanese to rebuild their country as best they could? I am sure such questions have been raised before, but the answer as I see it is a simple one. To her everlasting credit, the United States realized before Japan's final surrender that the mere military defeat of Japan alone was not sufficient, that left at that point, the job was only half done, and that what remained to be done after Japan's military defeat was as important as the task of defeating the Japanese armed forces. It was essential that we should also win the peace.

It was thoroughly realized, therefore, that unless the United States assumed a real responsibility for Japan's reconstruction, all the blood and treasure expended for Japan's defeat would in a real sense have been wasted.

### U. S. Assumption of Occupation Duties

With this realization the United States assumed the primary responsibility for the Occupation of Japan.

This Occupation has indeed been unique in all history. Unlike almost all other occupations, it was not motivated by a spirit of vengeance or by any desire to make the vanquished pay the price of defeat. Rather, the Occupation of Japan was inspired by the desire to remove from Japan the root causes of deceit and aggression which had led to such tragedies as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, the Occupation of Japan had as its goal, not the punishment of the Japanese people, not the exacting of vengeance for injuries received, but rather, the rebuilding and reconstruction of the Japanese nation and people upon a new and sound basis whereby Japan could eventually return to the family of nations as a respected member committed to strive for the peace and well-being of the entire world.

Under this unique concept of an occupation, a vast program of democratic reform was inaugu-



## Senate Approval of Japanese Peace Treaty

### *Statement by Secretary Acheson*

[Released to the press March 21]

The approval by the U.S. Senate by an overwhelming vote of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the related security treaties with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines is an event of great significance.

It is an important step in the making of a satisfactory peace settlement in the Pacific.

It is one of a series of great actions which free peoples are taking to create and consolidate a world-wide system of peace and freedom with security.

It is a demonstration to the world at large of the essential unity of the American people in pursuit of these goals.

I should like to pay tribute to the brilliant and devoted role which for a year and a half John Foster Dulles has played in the negotiation of the treaties and the San Francisco conference and in explaining the treaties before the Senate.

Throughout this year and a half and in the final consideration in the Senate, the Executive Branch has had the invaluable guidance and help of Senators of both parties. This has been an outstanding example of bipartisan foreign policy at its most effective. From the very outset the chairmen of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and members of both parties of the Far Eastern subcommittees have been in constant consultation with us.

rated, affecting the entire political, economic, and social life of the nation. The whole structure of the Japanese military machine was liquidated, the remaining Japanese forces disarmed and disbanded. Japanese who surrendered outside Japan were promptly repatriated and disbanded so that they could begin life anew as peaceful citizens. This great process of disarming and disbanding the once powerful Japanese military machine is an outstanding example of efficient and yet humanitarian achievement on the part of the United States and the Allied Powers. There was, however, one glaring exception. The Japanese armed forces and civilians who fell into the hands of the Soviet Union when Soviet forces occupied Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands were not promptly repatriated as the Potsdam Declaration provided. Instead most of these soldiers and civilians were carried off to Siberia and other areas under Soviet control and placed into forced labor camps. Only after repeated representations on the part of the Supreme Commander did the Soviet Union belatedly and grudgingly undertake to repatriate any of this slave labor force of whom some 370 thousand individuals are yet to be accounted for. In the light of the circumstances revealed by those Japanese who were fortunate enough to be repatriated, it can only be presumed that most of those still unaccounted for have perished while in Soviet custody from overwork, undernourishment, and the harsh treatment typical of the Soviet slave labor system.

But the unique Occupation of Japan was not concerned only with the disarming and disbanding of the Japanese military machine. That was merely an initial and necessary step to a much more far-reaching program of reform and reconstruction, which included a new, democratic Constitution, the reform of the land system, the equality of women, the reform of the courts and the judiciary, universal suffrage, the complete overhauling of the educational system, the dissolution of the vast, monopolistic corporate interests—the so-called “zaibatsu”—the removal from public office of all persons who had been associated with Japan’s previous totalitarian system, the establishment of a free press and free speech, and the development of a democratic labor movement.

These reforms have been practical as well as ideal. They have provided Japan with a workable democratic system which has clearly demonstrated over the past 6 years that the Japanese have a real capacity for democratic government and a peaceful way of life.

In this great process of the reform and reconstruction of Japan, tribute must be paid to the ability and broad vision of Gen. Douglas MacArthur who as a great soldier not only played a major part in bringing Japan to defeat but also directed the Occupation of Japan as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. It was his task to implement the policies of the United States and the Far Eastern Commission, which could only have remained pieces of paper had they not been materialized within the complicated framework of Japanese life. This task has been successfully continued by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.

Under this unique Occupation Japan has made remarkable progress. Not only have the burned-out cities been rebuilt and the shattered factories put back into operation but the Japanese people have been offered new and more worthy aspirations. As a result, the enemy we fought so bitterly a few years ago has not only become our friend and ally today, but what is of even greater importance, an asset of the free world.

Once it became apparent that the Occupation with the willing cooperation of the Japanese had laid a sound foundation for Japan’s reconstruction as a democratic, peaceful nation, the United States found itself confronted with another great task, namely, to bring about a treaty of peace that would permit Japan to resume its well-earned place among the free nations of the world.<sup>2</sup>

### **Problems of a Peace Settlement**

In view of the great success of the Occupation in achieving its original objectives, it would have seemed that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan would have been a simple step. As you all

<sup>2</sup>For text of the Japanese peace treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349.

know, this was far from the case. There proved to be many obstacles to a Japanese peace treaty, the most difficult of which was the persistent demand of the Soviet Union that the terms be written by the four big powers, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. This meant in effect that not only the other nations that had been at war with Japan and who had suffered from Japanese aggression would have been excluded from the preparation of the treaty, but that the Soviet Union, by the use of its veto power in any Big Four Conference, could have effectively prevented the conclusion of any peace treaty which would not have left Japan a defenseless, easy prey for Communist aggression.

The task, therefore, fell to the United States to work out in agreement with all other countries concerned, including the Soviet Union, a basis for a peace settlement with Japan which would not only be a fair and just settlement for the Japanese people but would also take into account the interests and problems of all the nations which had been at war with Japan. By the great statesmanship and untiring effort of Ambassador John Foster Dulles, appointed by President Truman to this task, it was finally possible to harmonize and reconcile numerous differences and interests and achieve a peace settlement that was acceptable and generally satisfactory to all concerned. The peace conference at San Francisco last September saw the realization of this difficult labor, whereby 49 nations, including Japan, were able to find a common basis of understanding. The Soviet Union, had it so chosen, could have been a party to this settlement.

Unfortunately, the problems which grew out of Japan's defeat could not be settled by a peace treaty alone. The military collapse of Japan in 1945 had created a great power vacuum in eastern Asia which Communism, that imperialist arm of Soviet Russia, was quick to fill. The earlier threats posed by Japanese aggression in eastern Asia and the Pacific area were replaced by an even more serious menace to peace and freedom. In brief, the Communist attack in Korea, and the continued threat of Communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have created a new and formidable security problem in the Pacific area which had to be met if a peace treaty with Japan and the termination of the protective Occupation were not to turn over Japan to Communism and open the way to new Communist conquests in the Pacific.

To complete the pattern, of which the peace treaty is an important part, it has been necessary to work out an effective security system for the Pacific area. Ambassador Dulles also accomplished this great task as a parallel endeavor to his peace treaty negotiations by negotiating a Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, and by security treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. These treaties

envisage a system of collective security arrangements for the Pacific area.

By virtue of the Security Treaty with Japan and its supplementary Administrative Agreement recently negotiated,<sup>3</sup> it is visualized that the United States will retain military forces in and about Japan after the termination of the Occupation to safeguard Japan against aggression until the Japanese are in a position to provide adequately for their own security.

At this point, it might be asked why are we here in the United States so vitally concerned with Japan's future security? And some may also wonder why it is that this nation which was so recently our enemy has now become our ally?

I believe the answer can be summed up in the words I chose for the title of my address to you this evening: Japan today is an asset of the free world, a very vital and important asset. And, in the face of the threat to freedom, every asset which contributes to its defense must be preserved.

### Protection and Security for Japan

When I say that Japan is an asset of the free world, I am thinking in terms of 84 million Japanese people who have clearly demonstrated their desire and capacity to work on the side of the free world. I am thinking in terms of a people who have demonstrated outstanding know-how and managerial ability, who have built up an industrial complex with a heavy industrial potential unequalled in any other part of Asia. I am thinking of a proud, self-respecting people who, while deeply grateful for the aid we have given them, are anxious and determined to stand on their own feet, who dislike charity and hand-outs, and who, given fair opportunity, have the ability and the ambition to support themselves by their own industry and hard work. I believe that people possessing these qualities are worthy of our respect and admiration, and that in the support and defense of the free world we ourselves can be proud to be associated with them. I believe that people with such qualities can and will assist us as a stabilizing factor in the Pacific area, and that it is therefore in our own best interests that we make it possible for Japan to maintain itself as a free, independent, and democratic nation.

In the defense of the free world, the preservation of Japan's security is not an isolated problem, but affects the well-being and security of all free nations. For under Communist domination, Japan's now peaceful manpower would become a source of potential millions of trained soldiers, with a vast industrial complex to supplement the economic deficiencies of Communist China, with scientific knowledge and technical skill for which

<sup>3</sup> For text of Security Treaty, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464; for text of Administrative Agreement, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 382.

even the Soviets have demonstrated respect by their ruthless retention of Japanese technicians.

Japan's present assets for peace would become assets for aggression if Japan were to fall under Communist domination.

In explaining why I believe Japan is such a vital asset to the free world, I do not want to give the impression that I am thinking only in terms of Japan's material assets and technical abilities. In any assessment of Japan's importance to the free world, we must think primarily of the Japanese people and their aspirations as individual men and women. You can be sure that in their own evaluation of Japan, the masters of the Kremlin place a high premium on Japan's industrial potential, the know-how of its technicians, and the great manpower reservoir of its 84 million people. We can be sure, too, that the masters of the Kremlin care nothing for the individual aspirations of these men and women.

It is, therefore, the aspirations of the Japanese people which, in final analysis, make Japan the real asset of the free world. In their aspirations the Japanese are indisputably linked to the side of the free world. They realize as much as you and I do here tonight that their future freedom and well-being are bound with the future of the free nations. They realize as well as we do that there is no third choice, that if the free nations of the world do not survive, there can be no freedom for anyone. It is because of this unmistakable realization that the Japanese nation is aligned with us today. We must not think that the Peace and Security Treaties are the sole cause of Japan's alignment with the free world. These treaties merely represent the means by which this alignment has been made possible in response to Japan's genuine desire for freedom and peace and the opportunity to support herself by her own industriousness and hard work.

The Japanese people are already playing a vital role in the defense of the free world. Japan is whole-heartedly supporting the U.N. operation in Korea by providing extensive services. Japanese factories are producing on procurement order vast quantities of manufactured items essential to the U.N. effort, while Japanese ships and crews are ably helping to solve difficult transportation problems. Japanese from all walks of life, from members of the Imperial family to laborers are voluntarily contributing blood donations for the U.N. forces. Various Japanese civic organizations and other groups like the Japanese Red Cross are undertaking activities for the entertainment of wounded U.N. soldiers hospitalized in Japan.

But perhaps the greatest tribute to Japan's sincere support of the U.N. effort is the fact that in the early days of the Korean war, when we were compelled to pull out virtually all of the Occupation forces from Japan for use in Korea, there was not one single incident or gesture against what had then become the unarmed Occupation of Japan.

## The Menace of Communism

It is of real advantage to the free nations of the world to have such a friend and ally in the Far East. The necessity to defeat a misled Japan in the last war unfortunately gave Communism the chance to bid for the domination of Asia. Had not the United States moved into Japan, the Soviet Union would have occupied these vitally strategic islands. Even today the menacing power of Soviet Communism is dangerously close to Japan. At the eastern tip of Hokkaido, only 3 miles of water separate Japan from the Soviet-occupied Habomai Islands. At another point on eastern Hokkaido, it is only 12 miles to Kunashiri, the southernmost island of the Kuril chain, which is entirely under Soviet occupation. From the town of Wakkanai at the northern tip of Hokkaido, Soviet-occupied Sakhalin is plainly visible on a clear day. The rich, undeveloped island of Hokkaido, Japan's last frontier, is today virtually surrounded by the advanced outposts of Soviet power. In the rich fishing grounds off Hokkaido, Soviet patrol craft roam the seas to within 3 miles of the Japanese coastline and frequently seize Japanese fishing vessels which are taken with their crews to Sakhalin, the Kurils, or the Habomais. The crews are there interrogated by Soviet intelligence officers about conditions in Japan and the character of the Occupation forces. Occasionally, these Japanese fishing craft are confiscated and their crews fined for "violating" Soviet "territorial waters." The external threat of Soviet Communism to Japan's security is not, therefore, a hypothetical menace; it is a visible reality.

But Communism also poses an internal threat to Japan's security. The Communist Party in Japan is directed by Moscow-trained Japanese Communists, many of whom are now operating from an illegal, underground network. Overtly, as well as covertly, the Japanese Communists are working day and night to undermine and destroy Japan's democratic institutions and economic stability, using the typical Communist methods of infiltration into labor and other organizations, creating various front groups which delude and take advantage of sincere but often misguided liberals, exploiting through agitation and propaganda every real or fancied grievance among the people, resorting to intimidation and terrorism through acts of violence and the inciting of disorders.

Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people have the intelligence to see through the typical tricks of the Communists and are not deceived by their agitation and propaganda. Fortunately, too, the reconstruction of Japan under the Occupation has provided a sound, democratic, political, and economic structure which is successfully resisting the corrosive elements of Communism.

But any nation's security requires constant vigilance. Heretofore, Japan has been able to



depend for her security largely upon the protection of the United States.

The Security Treaty with Japan provides for this protection until Japan is in a position to build up her own defensive strength. As I stated earlier, the Japanese are a proud people who dislike to depend upon others for things which they feel they should properly provide for themselves. The Japanese dislike accepting alms whether in the form of economic relief or protection. I am convinced, therefore, that under the Security Treaty the Japanese will rise to meet their own responsibilities for their own defense and will not be content to permit the United States to shoulder almost the entire burden. The Japanese are firm believers in equality, not just equality of privilege, but equality of responsibility as well.

Our new partnership with Japan is one based upon a genuine community of interests. But it is also a unique partnership. It demonstrates that an oriental nation and people can work on a basis of equality, cooperation, and understanding with an occidental nation and people. It demonstrates that all free nations, whether of the East or the West, have the same fundamental qualities, share the same aspirations, and have the same determination to work toward a common goal. This American-Japanese partnership is, therefore, in accord with the underlying purposes and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, and sets an example, not only to the other countries of Asia, but to all free nations of what can be achieved through understanding and cooperation.

The record is now clear. As the Treaty of Peace with Japan is about to come into force, the free world is to acquire a valuable asset in the form of a nation of 84 million people with a demonstrated capacity to contribute to the welfare and progress of all nations. Japan will thus constitute a vital, strong link in the defense of the free world against ruthless Communist enslavement. Japan, as an equal partner in the free community of equals, is of vital importance in contributing to this defense.

### **Financial Aid to Iran Considered**

*In connection with press reports from Iran on the question of U.S. financial aid, the Department released the following statement on March 20:*

The United States has received several requests, both written and oral, from the Iranian Government for loans for direct financial assistance to ease the acute situation in which the Iranian Government finds itself as a result of the loss of its oil revenues. The U.S. position in response to these requests has been that while the United States desires to be in a position to render Iran any proper and necessary assistance, it could not justify aid of

the type requested at a time when Iran has the opportunity of receiving adequate revenues from its oil industry without prejudice to its national aspirations. It has been pointed out that the United States is bearing a heavy financial burden in its efforts to help bring about a stable and lasting peace and that it is most difficult to undertake additional commitments to a country which has the immediate means of helping itself.

The United States has not, as indicated in press reports originating in Iran, established as a condition for granting financial aid to Iran that the Iranian Government should accept any particular proposals. The United States has consistently maintained that a settlement is possible in which the legitimate interests of both Iran and the United Kingdom will be protected and which will make the resumption of the oil-industry operation feasible and practicable from the economic viewpoint. We believe that the offer of the International Bank to assist in this matter has provided a good opportunity to reach this objective, even though on an interim basis. We continue to hope that a formula will be found which will be acceptable to both parties.

### **Export-Import Bank Grants Credits to Indonesia**

On March 15, the Export-Import Bank of Washington announced four credits to the Indonesian Government aggregating \$22,770,000. These credits are in addition to those announced in January 1951 when the first loan agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Bank was signed covering credits aggregating \$52,245,500. Thus, total credits authorized by the Bank amount to \$75,015,500 and represent allocations from the \$100,000,000 earmark for the Republic of Indonesia established by the Export-Import Bank in February 1950. The loan is being used to finance the importation from the United States of productive equipment and materials required for the reconstruction and development of vital sectors of the Indonesian economy.

The credit agreement of January 1951 consisted of allocation of \$20,000,000 for the purchase of automotive equipment; \$2,100,000 for road-building equipment; \$6,700,000 for dredges, warehouses, and other equipment and materials for the rehabilitation of port facilities; \$17,100,000 for the purchase of railway equipment, including principally diesel-electric locomotives, track-laying supplies and equipment, and machine tools for railroad shops; \$6,085,500 for the purchase of eight airplanes to be used by the Garuda Indonesian Airways; and \$260,000 for telecommunication equipment.

The allocations announced are as follows:

Eight million three hundred thousand dollars for the purchase of diesel-electric generating equipment, hydroelectric generating equipment, transmission line materials, and accessory control and protective equipment to assist the Indonesian Government and private utilities to restore damaged generating plants and to permit increased production of electric energy in certain critically short areas.

Ten million dollars for the purchase of additional automotive equipment, principally trucks, but also including busses, jeeps, and some passenger cars urgently required for the 1952 Indonesian program to restore motor vehicle transportation facilities.

Two million six hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the purchase of equipment for four sawmills; rails and diesel locomotives for forestry railroads in the Java teak area; forestry equipment for logging, skidding, loading, and unloading; and trucks and trailers for log transport.

One million eight hundred and twenty thousand dollars for the purchase of 40 marine engines to be installed in coastal cargo and passenger vessels, hulls for which have been ordered in Western Europe.

The credit extended to finance the purchase of electric equipment was authorized by the Board of Directors of the Bank early in 1951, and the three other credits have been authorized since November 1951. Funds advanced under the terms of the credits will bear interest at the rate of 3½ percent per annum and will be repayable in 30 approximately equal semiannual installments beginning March 1, 1956.

Herbert E. Gaston, chairman of the Board of the Export-Import Bank, said in making the announcement:

These credits are the result of the continued cooperation between the Export-Import Bank and the Government of Indonesia looking toward effective rehabilitation and development of the Indonesian economy. That cooperative effort has taken the form of continuous study and negotiation in Washington as well as an Export-Import Bank mission to Indonesia in the summer and fall of 1951.

## Negotiation of Saar Question

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*

[Released to the press March 21]

As you are no doubt aware, Foreign Minister Schuman of France and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany have agreed to negotiate a settlement of the Saar. We are very pleased to learn this. This agreement which places interests of Europe first reflects statesmanship of a high order. The agreement reached at Paris augurs well for a final solution of this century old problem.

March 31, 1952

## Visit of Queen of the Netherlands

On March 17 the Department of State announced that Queen Juliana of the Netherlands and the Prince of the Netherlands and their party will arrive at Washington on April 2. President and Mrs. Truman will meet the party at the Washington National Airport. On that evening, President and Mrs. Truman will give a dinner in honor of the Queen and the Prince.

On April 3 the party will visit Mount Vernon and Arlington National Cemetery. At 12:30 p. m. that day the Queen will address the Congress, and, on that evening, she and the Prince will be entertained by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Acheson.

On April 4 Queen Juliana will present to the President a temporary carillon as a symbol of the permanent carillon to be offered by the people of the Netherlands to the people of the United States. On that evening the Queen and the Prince will give a dinner in honor of President and Mrs. Truman at the Netherlands Embassy.

On April 5 the party will depart for Philadelphia, where Queen Juliana will be honored by a ceremony at the Philadelphia Museum of Art, and later, the party will depart for West Point Airport, New York.

On April 7 the party will go to New York City where the Mayor will receive the Queen and the Prince at City Hall. On April 8 Columbia University will bestow an honorary degree on Her Majesty.

During the period April 10-21, the party's itinerary will include visits to the following cities: Knoxville, Tenn., Detroit, Grand Rapids, Holland and Ann Arbor, Mich., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. The party will leave Los Angeles for Canada on April 22.

## WHO's Offer of Assistance To Korean Epidemic Victims

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*

[Released to the press March 21]

The World Health Organization (WHO) offer of assistance to victims of reported epidemics in North Korea, as announced by U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie this morning, has our full support. We of the free world are always interested in helping the sick and suffering and we have profound sympathy for the Korean people. The U.S. Government, as the Unified Command, is fully prepared to cooperate with WHO. If the Communists do not accept WHO's generous offer it will simply confirm that they have no regard for the welfare of the people under their control.

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## U.S. Charges Rumanian Violation of Treaty Provisions on Human Rights

[Released to the press March 18]

*The Secretary of State on March 18 instructed Ambassador Warren R. Austin, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations copies of a supplement to the volume submitted by Ambassador Austin to the Secretary-General on November 16, 1951, containing evidence of the violation by the Rumanian Government of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning freedom of expression and freedom of press and publication in Rumania.<sup>1</sup>*

*The supplemental volume contains facsimiles of the original Rumanian and Russian language texts of evidence heretofore submitted in English translation. These exhibits, deriving in greater part from the Rumanian Government, demonstrate that Government's guilt of the charges made against it by the United States on this subject.*

*Simultaneously the Department of State has delivered to the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Washington, for transmission to his Government at Bucharest, copies of both books. Following is the text of the note delivered by the United States to the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in this connection:*

### U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 18

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the Rumanian People's Republic and transmits herewith, for the information of the Rumanian Government, three copies of Department of State publication No. 4376 entitled "Evidence of Violations of Human Rights Provisions of the Treaties of Peace by Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, submitted by the United States Government to the Secretary General of the United Nations pursuant to the resolution of the General Assembly of November 3, 1950, Volume I, Violations by the Rumanian Government, Freedoms of Expression and of Press and Publication,"<sup>2</sup> together with three

copies of a supplement containing facsimile reproductions of original exhibits included in English translation in Volume I. Volume I was submitted by the United States Government to the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 16, 1951, and the supplement is being submitted presently.

The Secretary of State takes this occasion to note that the Rumanian Government has referred to the contents of Volume I, following its submission to the Secretary General of the United Nations, as "a collection of lies and falsifications." Such references were made by the Rumanian Government in a declaration in its controlled press on December 6, 1951.

This declaration the Rumanian Government repeated in a volume distributed by it during the meeting of the last General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris, entitled "The Aggressive Policy and Machinations of American Imperialism Against the Rumanian People's Republic."

The attention of the Rumanian Government is called to the fact that of the eighty-nine exhibits, with sub-exhibits, constituting the evidence offered by the United States Government to support its charges that the Rumanian Government has violated the provisions of the Treaty of Peace by which the Rumanian Government undertook to secure the enjoyment of freedom of expression and freedom of press and publication in Rumania, sixty-five, including sub-exhibits, are reproduced in the supplement in facsimile of the original form. These sixty-five include articles or statements by Soviet Communist authorities (four exhibits), quotations from the Rumanian Constitution (three exhibits), quotations from the official Rumanian Government press or Rumanian newspapers appearing during the period when the press has been under the Rumanian Government's control (six exhibits), and official legislation and decrees of the Rumanian Government as published in the official gazette, "Monitorul Oficial" or "Buletinul Oficial," and similar government publications (forty-six exhibits). Since these sixty-five exhibits, including sub-exhibits, have been in documents believed to be official, the Rumanian

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1951, p. 867.

<sup>2</sup> For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at 75¢ a copy (paper cover).



Government is invited to specify which, if any, of these exhibits it charges fall in the category of "lies and falsifications" and to specify further the respects in which the "lie" or "falsification" is comprised.

The remaining exhibits offered by the United States Government as evidence in Volume I consist, for the most part, of certain affidavits or declarations sworn to before persons authorized to administer oaths in various countries. These include forty documents, including sub-exhibits. If the remarks of the Rumanian Government were intended to apply to these latter exhibits, the Rumanian Government is invited to specify which of them it believes fall into the category of "lies and falsifications," giving again the respects in which the "lie" or "falsification" is comprised.

If, on the other hand, the Rumanian Government does not contend that the excerpts from its official publications, or from the writings of Communist leaders, or from the Rumanian Press, contained in the exhibits, have in fact been forged or otherwise falsified by the United States or by others, but means only that the Rumanian Government differs in the interpretation thereof, or if the Rumanian Government, while not charging that the signatures of affiants have been forged or falsified or that the affiants have wilfully lied, differs with respect to the facts to which the affiants have testified, the attention of the Rumanian Government is called to the introductory statement of the United States Government in Volume I as follows (page vi):

The Rumanian Government is invited to offer in any appropriate way such evidence—in the legal sense—as it may have in rebuttal and to submit that evidence to further objective verification.

The United States Government has looked in vain in the publications of the Rumanian Government on this subject to which reference has been made above for the submission of any evidence in any legal sense; it has instead found unsupported conclusions, unresponsive and irrelevant assertions, always without factual proof, and statements which, insofar as they might be relevant, the United States would be prepared to demonstrate, in any appropriate forum governed by rules of legal procedure, to be false.

It is clear to the United States, as it must be to objective persons examining these documents, that the failure of the Rumanian Government to meet the issues of fact and of law in this matter, coupled with that Government's evasion of its established legal duty to submit these issues for trial by the Commission provided in the Treaty of Peace, or by any other judicial body, constitute an unquestionable admission by the Rumanian Government that the charges made by the United States against that Government were correct, that the evidence submitted by the United States amply sustains its charges against the Rumanian Gov-

ernment and that, therefore, the Rumanian Government stands convicted in accordance with the normal legal rules obtaining in civilized countries of violating the Treaty of Peace by wilfully and systematically denying to its citizens and other persons in its jurisdiction the enjoyment of elemental human rights and fundamental freedoms which the Rumanian Government pledged.

The Secretary of State takes this occasion to repeat what he said in submitting Volume I to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

From its past performance one may expect the Rumanian Government—and the other accused governments—to say, always in general terms, that the charges to which this first installment of evidence relates have not been proved and that its persecutions have been directed solely to the suppression of Nazism and Fascism and to make other self-serving statements of sweeping generality. This will not do. Verifiable facts are called for from the accused, not mere conclusions nor name calling. The truth is that, since the charges and the evidence in support thereof relate to facts localized in the territory of Rumania, their truth or falsity in the event of dispute may best be determined by inquiries on the spot in Rumania—and in Hungary and Bulgaria. Were the accused governments sincerely concerned with establishing the truth, they would welcome an arbitral commission of the kind stipulated by the Treaty of Peace. In this case, the commission would receive the testimony of officials of the Rumanian Government concerned with press, radio, books, theater, book publishing and similar matters; it would question other persons within Rumania having testimonial qualifications and otherwise make the dispassionate, careful inquiry which civilized nations expect of judicial tribunals, attended by effective assurances to witnesses against intimidations or reprisals. This the accused governments have thus far refused to permit. The refusal of the accused governments to respect their treaty obligations by joining in the establishment of commissions must be taken as born in substantial part out of the suspicion that such a tribunal would seek and find a way to obtain evidence which these governments prefer to conceal.

In submitting its material, the United States Government is guided by the legal meaning of the word "evidence" used in the General Assembly resolution; that is, as denoting testimony which is logically probative of issues of fact raised by charges made and the replies thereto, and which is acceptable for consideration under standards for the conduct of judicial proceedings generally prevailing in civilized countries.

## Recent Releases

**United States Educational Foundation in Denmark.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2324. Pub. 4424. 11 pp. 5¢.

**Agreement between the United States and Denmark—Signed at Copenhagen Aug. 23, 1951; entered into force Aug. 23, 1951.**

**Land Reform—A World Challenge.** Economic Cooperation Series 29. Pub. 4445. 81 pp. 20¢.

A discussion with related papers, including statements by Secretary Acheson and Isador Lubin; addresses by Willard L. Thorp and Henry G. Bennett; resolution of the Economic and Social Council.

## Poland Asked To Cease Issuance Of Abusive Publications in U. S.

[Released to the press March 21]

*The United States on March 21 delivered a note to the Polish Embassy in Washington protesting the issuance by the Embassy on March 3 of a press release concerning the investigation by the Madden Committee of the House of Representatives into facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn Forest massacre. As a consequence of the issuance of this press release by the Polish Embassy, Secretary Acheson, in the U.S. note, requests that Polish Government establishments in the United States cease immediately the issuance of all publications and of press releases of the nature of that issued on March 3.*

### U.S. Note of March 21

The Secretary of State wishes to refer His Excellency the Ambassador of Poland to a matter of serious concern to the United States Government

involving a press release which was issued by the press office of the Polish Embassy on March 3, 1952, under the heading, "Polish Statement on Madden Committee".

This propaganda utterance released by the Embassy was designed as a calculated and completely baseless attack on the United States and its Congress, as well as on the aspirations of the United States for peace and international security. In addition, the press release made wholly untrue allegations concerning the actions of the United Nations in Korea.

In both tone and contents this abusive press release exceeded the limits of propriety which international custom and usage have established for press offices of a mission of one state acting within the territory of another state.

The Secretary of State protests this outrageous and improper action of the Embassy and in consequence requests that Polish Government establishments in the United States cease immediately the issuance of all publications, and of press releases of this character.

## Rewards of U.S.-Mexican Cooperation

*by Edward G. Miller, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

This seems a suitable occasion for calling to mind what I feel is an important anniversary in our good neighborly relations. Just 10 years ago, the Mexican-American Commission for Economic Cooperation was established. It was a historical milestone in our record of cooperation as neighbors and friends. It strengthened both of us for the part that we played in World War II in our resistance against Axis aggression.

Our contacts with Mexico are continuous. Some 30 thousand of our own citizens visit that country monthly, many of them by car, and the number is increasing steadily. What our citizens spend in Mexico in order to see its lovely sights and enjoy its warm hospitality now constitutes, in effect, Mexico's largest single export to the United States, since those tourists spend in Mexico nearly 200 million dollars per year. In addition, Mexico's commercial exports to the United States total 326 million dollars for 1951, with imports from the United States of 711 million dollars for the same year.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the Mexican-United States Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 13 and released to the press on the same date.

### Past and Present Cooperative Endeavors

It is heartening to look at some of the many ways in which our two countries are cooperating for our mutual advantage, through both official and private agencies. Take agriculture, for example. One of the urgent needs of our time is to increase the productivity of the world's essential food crops. In Mexico corn is the basic food. While in the United States also we rightly regard corn as of major importance, since it is our most valuable as well as our largest crop, we find the figures for Mexico astonishing. There, 60 percent of the country's cropland is planted in corn. It is the staple food of the people; vital to their very existence. Consequently, such successful cooperation as has been carried on between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican Government for the purpose of increasing corn productivity is of inestimable value. Agricultural scientists from the Foundation train young Mexican research assistants who will eventually take over the work altogether, and the Foundation assists also in building and equipping the necessary laboratories. When the project was inaugurated 9 years ago, in 1943, the average Mexican small farmer produced 10 bushels of corn per acre, and

the quality was generally poor. In 1948 for the first time in 35 years, Mexico did not have to import corn. By 1949 there was enough seed of good synthetic varieties, produced by the cooperative project, to plant one million acres, almost one-tenth of Mexico's cornland. In that same year a small farmer in Texcoco produced 125 bushels to the acre from the Rockefeller-Mexican—or Roca-mex—hybrid seed. Incidentally, Mexico has borne more than half the cost of this project and the work has been carried on by 11 U.S. scientists, 5 Mexican technicians, and 56 Mexican laboratory assistants. The total cost has been little more than 2 million dollars. It has been rightly said that "seldom has so modest an investment yielded such astronomical returns in terms of food, progress, and human welfare."

A recent statement by President Alemán and an announcement by our Secretary of Agriculture just yesterday have highlighted another positive evidence of Mexican-American cooperation—the successful battle waged against the dread foot-and-mouth disease by the joint Mexican-United States Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease. The Secretary's announcement that Mexico will be declared free of the disease if no more outbreaks occur by September 1 is the goal toward which the two nations have jointly worked for almost 5 years, contributing labor, technical skill, and money to this all-important project. In the fields, in the offices, in the laboratories where vaccines were produced and tested, Mexicans and Americans have worked side by side, sharing equally the authority and responsibility.

On the governmental level one of the great achievements of the International Boundary and Water Commission is the joint construction of the big Falcón Dam, now well under way. Its benefits to agriculture will be immediate, continuous, and transforming. The Commission is cooperating effectively, not only on this, but in the working out of all of the complications involved in our joint boundary, including the important problem of the equitable distribution of water from both the Rio Grande and the Colorado.

#### **Extension of U.S. Economic Support**

Also just a decade ago, in 1942, Mexico obtained a loan in this country in order to build and expand its own steel-making capacity. Our economic cooperation with Mexico may be figured in terms of the loans which have been made by the Export-Import Bank for many purposes, such as Mexico's program of highway construction; the development and expansion of the steel, sugar, sulphur, and mining industries; the rehabilitation of its railways; financing its broad electrification program; and for financing the importation of Mexican handicraft for sale in the United States. In the last few years Mexican plans for economic development have also been given impetus through

the cooperation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which has invested approximately 90 million dollars in Mexico. While most of this has gone into the development of Mexico's electric resources, one particularly interesting operation was the line of credit of 10 million dollars extended by the International Bank to a consortium of Mexican private banks for the financing of small industry. It is a great tribute to the credit standing of Mexico that approximately 400 million dollars has been placed in Mexico through these two lending institutions in Washington.

The great bulk of this financing has been handled in Mexico by Nacional Financiera, the financial agency of the Mexican Government which has so effectively devoted its resources to Mexico's economic development.

It might be noted parenthetically that it is a tribute to the versatility of Mexican culture that one family could produce two such distinguished leaders in widely differing fields as Licenciado Antonio Carrillo Flores, head of Nacional Financiera, on the one hand, and his distinguished father, Don Julián Carrillo, composer of the symphonic work "Horizontes."

I would like to make one more point about U.S. economic cooperation, which is that it can be measured not only in terms of credits but also in terms of deliveries of essential products. A year ago, when the foreign ministers of the American Republics were meeting here in Washington, there was considerable anxiety, on both sides of the Rio Grande, about the United States' ability to carry out a rearmament program and still continue to supply Latin America with the products essential for economic development. Today, the rate and composition of our exports should quell much of that anxiety. There was intense concern about the availability of tin plate. Today there is no problem in tin-plate supplies as far as Latin America is concerned. In many commodities, we have not only continued to export but have considerably increased our exports. For example, American exports to Latin America of iron and steel in the past year, 1951, were 29 percent greater than in 1950, increasing from 968,000 tons in 1950 to 1,246,000 tons in 1951. The record in many other commodities is equally good, and the general outlook is even better provided the world situation does not change for the worse.

One great accomplishment of these past 10 years is written in bold lines on the map, for Mexico has completed her own section of the Pan American Highway; 1,619 miles long and 99 percent paved; open to year-round traffic; and running from Nuevo Laredo to the Guatemalan border. She has interlaced the whole Republic with a splendid system of roads in order to make surface travel speedy and easy, including a highway from El Paso through the State of Chihuahua to Mexico City; and still another from Nogales



to Guadalajara. We have become so accustomed to speaking of such thoroughfares as arteries of commerce that the phrase is somewhat worn with use but it describes exactly what they are: branching routes that carry the hearts blood of the country's commerce from section to section. It is an evident fact that these highways are in great part responsible for Mexico's good financial condition. Take the one item of tourists alone.

There are, of course, many positive evidences, in many widely separate fields, of the cooperation between our Governments for the increased welfare of our peoples. In the sorely vexed question of the *braceros*, for example, the United States and Mexico are cooperating to arrange conditions satisfactory to both countries which will enable surplus Mexican workers to come to work in the United States in communities where the labor supply cannot meet the urgent need.

In still another field, we have reason for satisfaction in the cooperation between Mexican and U.S. distributors of winter fruits and vegetables. Together they are undertaking to regulate the timing and amount of these products brought into the United States, with monthly quotas for such things as tomatoes and cantaloupes.

The steadily increasing interest of U.S. business in Mexico is shown by the number of our firms that maintain representation or have established subsidiaries there. In this connection your group might well consider the disparity between Mexican legislation which tends to discourage foreign investments in national industrial enterprises and the actual climate for such investments, which is currently favorable. As we all know, Mexican business itself is perfectly well aware that competition quickens industrial development. Furthermore, a new industry may enrich the national economy in unexpected ways. We might mention here the success of Sears Roebuck in showing what can be done along that line. I understand that their branch store established in Mexico City a couple of years ago features products of Mexican origin rather than imported goods.

The rewards of cooperation are great and the benefits are mutual. We all know that they are worth far more than the effort that they take, even though we are all at the same time perfectly well aware how much effort is sometimes required. Good will is the keynote of our dealings with one another, in business, in diplomacy, in all the complex relationships of twentieth century life.

I would like to close by recalling a forthright statement endorsed by the 21 American Republics and attesting our common faith in our common future and in the path toward its attainment. That statement, approved at Chapultepec just 7 years and one week ago, at the plenary session of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held March 6, 1945, declares that "the Inter-American community is dedicated to the ideals of peaceful cooperation." This is a

faith held equally by every one of our American countries, and its power is precisely in the fact that it is shared by all.

## Radio Agreement Enters Into Force

On April 13, 1952, the Inter-American Radio Agreement, signed at Washington on July 9, 1949, will enter into force between the Governments of Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the United States. Article 13 of the agreement provides that it shall come into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the fifth acceptance with the U. S. Government. The fifth acceptance was deposited on March 14, 1952, by Nicaragua. Other countries which have deposited acceptances are Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and the United States.

## Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>

### Economic and Social Council

The Problem of Statelessness. Information Transmitted by States in Pursuance of Economic and Social Council Resolution 352 (XII) Relating to the Problem of Statelessness. E/2164/Add.10, February 6, 1952. 24 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Europe: Inland Transport Committee. Text of International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Passengers and Baggage Carried by Rail, as adopted by the Inland Transport Committee at its eighth (special) session. E/ECE/137 and E/ECE/TRANS/318, January 17, 1952. 14 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Conditions and Problems of Economic Development in Non-Self-Government Territories. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2176, February 20, 1952. 10 pp. mimeo.

Social Commission. Social Services. Planning, Organization and Administration for Social Welfare. Methods of Administering Assistance to the Needy. Study by the Secretary-General of Programmes in Seven Countries. E/CN.5/273, January 16, 1952. 62 pp. mimeo.

(Continued on page 519)

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

## Advancement of World Peace Through Disarmament

*Statements by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen  
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

### PROPOSALS FOR COMMISSION'S WORK<sup>1</sup>

We are met here to consider how peace may be made more secure and the general welfare advanced by disarmament. We have been given a broad mandate by the General Assembly because the peoples of the world want a world free from the burden and fear of armaments. It is no accident that President Roosevelt translated the fourth freedom—freedom from fear—into world terms to mean “a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”

We meet here to discuss disarmament as nations are building up their armed strength because of their fears of each other's armed strength. The fear of armaments has led not to disarmament but to increased armaments, increased suspicion and profound distrust. Armaments have not only been growing in volume: They have so grown in destructive power that another total war might conceivably destroy the whole civilized world.

Nations' fears have multiplied their arms, and nations' arms have multiplied their fears. The people of the world look to this Commission to find a way to reverse this process: To achieve balance by reduction, instead of by production, of armed forces and armaments. The people look to us for guidance away from this wasteful approach to security, and toward the constructive approach—a systematic plan for getting out from under the burden and fear.

Ours is therefore a terrifying responsibility. We must not fail.

There should be no question as to our goal.

Our goal is freedom from fear. The goal can

be reached by reducing armaments to such a point, in such a thorough fashion, and with such fool-proof safeguards that no nation is in a position to wage successful war. That means the elimination of mass armies and other instruments of mass destruction. That means an open world with no secret armies, no secret weapons, and no secret war plans.

With effective disarmament in a truly open world, no nation would have reason to fear or suspect that any other nation was covertly making preparations to fight a war. In such a world, any new aggressor's flouting of the rules of the open world would be known long before he could put himself in a position to fight a war.

We have already learned from our work in the Atomic Energy Commission and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments that it is difficult to make genuine progress unless we tackle the problem of armaments and the problems of balanced armed strength as a whole. We cannot make progress by eliminating one category of armaments only to build up armed strength in other ways. We may indeed find it relatively easier and more practicable to enforce a genuine and drastic disarmament system in an open world than to police an armed world with elaborate and involved ceilings on various and not readily comparable categories of armaments.

All members of the United Nations have agreed not to use force in their international relations except to keep the peace, as provided by the Charter. If we are serious in our undertakings to eliminate the use of force as an instrument of national policy, we should be willing to move toward the goal of universal disarmament as rapidly as effective safeguards can be devised and put into effect to protect law abiding states from the hazards of violations and evasions. In a disarmed world, nations will need only a small militia

<sup>1</sup> Made before the U.N. Disarmament Commission at New York, N. Y., on Mar. 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

with small arms, to cope with internal disorders. A small militia with small arms would not be tempted to stray into its neighbor's territory.

Once the goal of a disarmed and truly open world is attained, the task of statesmanship to keep the peace would become much easier. In an open and a relatively disarmed world, measures to maintain security against a lawbreaker, if undertaken promptly, could be carried out with a minimum of force.

If such a world is accepted as our goal, how do we get there?

Distrust and suspicion and political differences interpose serious and perhaps insuperable obstacles in the way of the quick attainment of our goal. The Secretary of State said in Paris last fall:

When it comes to reducing armaments, there must obviously be some connection between the solution of great problems, the reduction of tensions, and the reduction of armaments. . . .

On the other hand, the very working out of such a system . . . will in itself help to reduce these tensions and help us to find solutions for problems which now seem very difficult to us. . . .

. . . the inauguration of such a system will in and of itself . . . furnish a turning point in history, a point from which the world can turn away from tension and the danger of war and turn toward cooperation for the establishment of peace.<sup>2</sup>

This is to say that, if we reach our goal of an unarmed, open world, many of the causes of existing suspicion and distrust, and many of the existing political differences, would no longer disturb us. Progress in one field goes with progress in the other. In any case, if we knew of a certainty that no nation was in a state of preparedness to undertake a major war, there would be a profound change in the climate of international relationships. Differences would remain—differences in ideas, differences in interest—but the people would know that they could not suddenly explode into war. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war, to make war inherently and constitutionally impossible as a means of adjusting disputes between nations.

These changes will not be made overnight. It is hard for men accustomed to living in the dark to trust themselves in the light. We are all deeply concerned about our national safety. No responsible statesman can be expected to risk the national security of his country for a hope which may prove to be illusory. We do know that within our lifetime aggressors have used disarmament agreements and nonaggression pacts to lull their victims into a false sense of security. We must not let that happen again. What we want is a balanced reduction in arms and in armies to the lowest possible levels, based, as President Truman has stated, "on safeguards that will insure the compliance of all nations."

Until we can agree on and put into effect a sys-

tem of balanced reduction with adequate and effective safeguards, free nations cannot leave their freedom and security at the mercy of the uncontrolled armed strength of other nations. Until all do reduce, the free must continue to produce, in order to keep the peace. But President Truman has stated:

We would prefer to see the nations cut down their armed forces on a balanced basis that would be fair to all. That is the way we hoped the world would follow 6 years ago when we helped to set up the United Nations. And it is what we are still working for—an international order without the burden of tremendous armaments.<sup>3</sup>

We here must face the difficulties of our task. If we wish to make progress we must try to understand one another's problems. We must avoid re-creation and abuse. We will not make progress by boasting of our own good intentions and casting the blame for failure on others. It is better that we should be able to report some tangible progress than that we excoriate each other for not reaching heaven in a single bound.

#### The General Assembly's Mandate

I hope this progress can be made, even if a little at a time, along a broad front. Our mandate from the General Assembly is not a limited one:

the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Obviously the General Assembly does not believe that we can reach the goal the world wants by abolishing one weapon, or adopting promises no one can enforce, or recommending reductions without regard to what the present levels are. Law abiding nations cannot be expected to agree to any formula of arms reduction which would perpetuate an existing imbalance of armed strength and aggravate, rather than relieve their fears of aggression.

The General Assembly also requires us to look at the total world picture, and to understand the relationship between the whole and its interdependent parts. An English poet has defined freedom as "leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the Law." Nations, like individuals, do not feel secure in their freedom unless they have leave to live by no other nations' leave, underneath the law. Many of the present difficulties both in Europe and in Asia spring from an imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations to feel that they live only by leave or grace of their more powerful and none too friendly neighbors. If a balanced reduction of arms is to reduce fear of

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 888.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 799.



### **U.S. Proposal for Plan of Work**

U.N. doc. DC/3, dated Mar. 14, 1952

#### **A. Disclosure and verification:**

- (a) plans for the progressive and continuing disclosures of all armed forces, including paramilitary, security and police forces, and all armaments including atomic,
- (b) methods of verification, in particular through international inspection, to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information thus disclosed.

#### **B. Methods of calculating and fixing over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments, including:**

- (a) effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
- (b) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

#### **C. The development of agreed national programmes, by negotiation among States under the auspices of the Commission, and the allocation within the respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments.**

#### **D. Methods of implementing and enforcing the disarmament programme, including:**

- (a) the establishment of an international control organ or organs with appropriate rights, powers and functions,
- (b) the elaboration of effective safeguards.

#### **E. Procedure and timetable for giving effect to the disarmament programme.**

aggression, it must take into account the balance of armed strength of the most powerful states not only in relation to one another, but also in relation to their neighbors. In other words, a truly balanced program of disarmament must deal not only with the relations of the powerful states with each other, but must redress the present imbalance of armed strength in Europe and Asia so as to dispel the fears of free nations in those areas.

It is with these thoughts in mind that the U.S. Government proposes for the consideration of the Disarmament Commission the draft plan of work now before you. This plan, on which we are anxious to have the views of other delegations, follows the language of the General Assembly resolution establishing this Commission. The language is deliberately designed to cover the essential elements of any balanced disarmament system without prejudging the details of those elements. We believe that any proposals any government may wish to advance can be considered under the appropriate headings of the plan.

In our deliberations here, there is room for all constructive ideas and we will need them. Every suggestion on practical ways and means of building a security system based on reduction instead of production of weapons needs to be thoroughly explored in an open-minded spirit—needs to be tested by hard facts of international life, by the

question as to whether the proposal will work in the mutual interest of all governments and all peoples.

### **Need for a Practical Plan**

The people of the world are not interested in propaganda tricks or polemics. They expect from us a workable plan for a new house of peace and security. They are interested in the livability of this structure. They believe that a new approach to world disarmament can be made and must be made in practical terms.

As I said earlier, my Government hopes that the Commission will explore all these points. We might most usefully begin with a consideration of those items on which agreement is most likely to facilitate further progress. The General Assembly has directed the Commission "to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification" of all armed forces—including paramilitary, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic, "the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution." That point is therefore first on our plan of work.

No responsible government can agree to cut its own defenses without knowing where such cuts will leave it in relation to the armed forces of other countries. As Abraham Lincoln said, "If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

We are directed to make our first report by June 1. The time is extremely short. We trust that if we concentrate on the items of disclosure and verification suggested we may be able to report some real progress which will enable us to grapple more intelligently with the other vital problems listed in our work plan. That does not mean that we should not give thought to other items in which there may be a possibility of early progress.

Starting with disclosure and verification, our plan of work moves forward to four other points which seem to us to embrace the rest of the ramified problems which must be explored in the development of an honest and workable disarmament system.

Having considered under our first point ways of finding out the armed strength of all nations, we come to grips in our second point with the heart of the disarmament problem. This second point involves the exploration of methods of setting limits on permitted armaments which includes, of course, the effective elimination of atomic weapons and all instruments adaptable to mass destruction—categories to which the General Assembly's resolution directs our special attention.

Our third point involves consideration of the methods by which, having agreed on the principles

of limitation and abolition of the various elements of armed strength, states would negotiate agreements with each other as to the armed forces and armaments permitted to each state and as to the distribution of the permitted elements within each national military establishment.

Next we come in our proposed work plan to the crucial question of how to enforce the principles of disarmament once those principles have been agreed upon and put into practice by all states possessed of substantial military strength. Under this item, we would consider the establishment of an international control organ or organs and the appropriate rights, powers, and functions of such a control organ, together with the safeguards necessary to deter any state from violating the agreed disarmament program.

Lastly, under our proposed work plan the Commission would consider the complex questions of procedure and timing involved in agreeing upon a disarmament program and putting that program into operation.

For the sake of convenience, the five points of our work plan have been set down in what seems to us a logical sequence but, quite frankly, we see no compelling reason for the Commission to examine these problems according to this or any other rigidly predetermined order, except insofar as the Commission is instructed to consider the matter of disclosure and verification from the outset. The order in which these problems are taken up, and whether by the Commission itself or by subcommittees of the part or of the whole, seem to us questions which the Commission should resolve in terms of its own best efficiency of operation. On these questions, as on the text of the plan of work we have put before you, my Government would welcome the views of the other members of the Commission.

In closing, I should emphasize that we offer these suggestions only as a beginning. Our desire is to proceed as rapidly as possible to the goal of an open world where national armaments will be reduced drastically, and mass armies and all other instruments of mass destruction completely eliminated, so that no state need stand in fear of aggression from any other state. Let us resolve to work together, determined, with God's help, to carry out our mandate: To lift from the peoples of this world the burden and fear of armaments and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programs of reconstruction and development. Let us work together to make this a friendly and peaceful world in which all men may have a chance to live out their lives free from fear which men have created and free from want which men can avoid.

<sup>4</sup> Made before the Disarmament Commission on Mar. 19 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

#### SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD DISARMAMENT <sup>4</sup>

As the members of the Commission will recall, I contented myself with two observations with respect to Mr. Malik's first two questions.<sup>5</sup> I stated *first* that the questions were out of order because they were addressed to substantive issues regarding arms reductions and prohibition and not to the proposed plan of work. I stated *second* that the questions clearly related to the substantive problems listed in the proposed work plan and could be discussed under it. But the Soviet representative, ignoring my reasoned reply, proclaimed that the U. S. representative had refused to give a direct answer to his questions. He willfully tried to disrupt the spirit of conciliation which I and other speakers had tried to introduce into our first meeting and attempted to make it appear that it was the United States instead of the Soviet Union which was preventing the Commission from getting on with its work. Such tactics on the part of the Soviet representative, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, are an affront not only to the United States, but to all States represented on this Commission. Such tactics, if continued, threaten to disrupt the work of the Commission and to obstruct efforts which all the rest of us are trying to exert, honestly and in good faith, to make progress in this difficult field of disarmament.

Let there be no misunderstanding. If the Soviet representative had any real, *bona fide* questions about our plan of work, he would have had no difficulty in getting enlightenment without a brawl.

I sent the proposed plan of work before last week's meeting to all members of the Disarmament Commission. I telephoned the Soviet delegation on Monday, March 10, 4 days before the meeting, and said that if there were any questions which the Soviet delegation had to raise, or any comments it had to offer on the proposed plan of work, I would be glad to talk to Mr. Malik or any other member of the Soviet delegation. I received no response to this invitation. It would seem that the Soviet representative is more eager to precipitate a propaganda fight over disarmament than to labor with us in good faith to work out concrete and practical plans of disarmament.

But as the Soviet representative chose to say that I refused to answer his questions, I propose to answer them, despite their irrelevance and impropriety at this stage of our proceedings.

Let me read you Mr. Malik's first question:

All States must, of course, when necessary, supply the United Nations Disarmament Commission with full information as to their available armaments. Once the decision to reduce armaments and prohibit weapons of

<sup>5</sup> Yakov Malik is the Soviet representative on the Disarmament Commission.

mass destruction has been taken in principle, then, of course, not a single State will refuse to supply such information.

It is important, therefore, to elucidate the question whether the United States representatives intend to support the proposal for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, for such a decision would make it possible immediately to obtain full information on the armaments of all States.

It is, I confess, a little difficult to distinguish Mr. Malik's question from his loaded explanations. But, if I understand the question, it is not new. It is simply the old question which the Soviet delegation has raised in the United Nations every year since 1946. Of course, everyone agrees "in principle" that armaments should be reduced and all weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited. The General Assembly set up the Disarmament Commission because all the members of the United Nations have declared themselves in favor of this principle. What we are here to do is to devise ways and means of reducing armaments and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. But the Soviet representative's question is a loaded question. He does not really want us to reiterate our devotion to disarmament. He really wants us to accept the old Soviet position that the way to reduce armaments and prohibit weapons of mass destruction is to make a pronouncement—to take, as he says, "a decision." What he wants us to do is to recommend to the General Assembly that it adopt the old Soviet proposal, raised in the United Nations time and again and always rejected, that the way to disarm is to pass a resolution. What he wants us to do is to agree to a proclamation reducing armaments and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction without establishing those safeguards which alone can guarantee that faith is kept and disarmament actually carried out. What he wants us to do is to obligate ourselves to disarm before there is any way of knowing that his Government is fulfilling its reciprocal obligation.

#### **U. S. Position Clear**

The position of the United States on this subject is clear and it has been stated time and time again in the various organs of the United Nations. The United States wants to reduce armaments and eliminate effectively and with foolproof safeguards all instruments of mass destruction, including mass armies, atomic warfare and germ warfare. But we are not going to delude our own people and the people of other countries by going through the motions of "taking a decision" on a general reduction of armaments and on the elimination of all instruments of mass destruction. We know that these things cannot be done in fact except by working out, agreeing upon, and putting into effect a system of safeguards which will ensure compliance by all States whose compliance is necessary to make the system work. In our own lifetime, aggressors have used disarmament

agreements and nonaggression pacts to lull their victims into a false sense of security. The people of the world want real disarmament and not disarmament only on paper. In matters involving the survival of the entire civilized world, no nation can in honesty to its own people disarm in reliance on the mere paper promise of another nation. That is the view taken not only by the United States. It is the view taken by the United Nations in rejecting the Soviet proposal each time it has come before it. But the Soviet Union pays little attention to the views of other nations. The Soviet Union is more concerned about talking disarmament than it is about finding means by which all nations can safely disarm.

We come now to Mr. Malik's second question. It reads as follows:

Since Mr. Acheson seeks to justify the armaments race, and in particular the colossal expansion of armaments in the United States, by reference to the alleged existence of large armies in the U.S.S.R. while the U.S.S.R. is proposing the immediate adoption of a decision on the reduction of the armed forces and the armaments of the five great Powers and on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, why not begin the work of the Disarmament Commission by adopting a decision on the substantial reduction of armaments, beginning with a reduction in the armaments of the five great Powers?

This question, like Mr. Malik's first question, is rhetorical and somewhat confused, but not new. While clothed in somewhat different words, it is the same proposal which the U. N. General Assembly has debated and rejected more than once. Apart from its reference to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction which is covered in the first question, it is the substantial equivalent of the Soviet proposal for an exchange of promises to reduce by one-third the armaments of the so-called Big Five—without verification and without knowing the actual levels from which there is to be this reduction. That is not a program for balanced-armed reduction. It is a program to perpetuate the superior armed strength of the Soviet Union in relation to the Western nations.

After World War II the Western nations reduced their arms drastically. Then came Korea. The Soviet Union then had 4,000,000 men in their regular armed forces; another 1,000,000 in security units and uniformed and secret Soviet police forces; 5,000,000 in all. In addition the Soviet Union controlled another 1,000,000 men in its eastern European satellites, a total of 6,000,000, not counting the Communist armies in Asia. At that time the United States had only 1,500,000 men and the United Kingdom and France together had somewhat less than that. To preserve peace, the Western nations are trying to remedy that dangerous imbalance. But until balance has been restored, the Western nations cannot accept any across-the-board percentage reduction which would perpetuate—or indeed accentuate—the present dangerous imbalance of forces. As I explained in my opening statement, we are for a balanced reduction of arms that will reduce and



not aggravate existing fears and tensions. We cannot accept the phony and illusory proposal of the Soviet which has been exposed and rejected by the General Assembly. Let me ask Mr. Malik a question. What would the Soviet Union have said to Hitler in 1938 if he had proposed a percentage reduction in all armed forces to them? Would the Soviets have disarmed in reliance on Hitler's promises?

#### Meaning of the Soviet Proposals

We must recognize the Soviet proposals embodied in these two questions for what they are—a Soviet attempt to hold, if not widen, the existing gap between the mass armies of the Soviet and the forces of the free world, and to strip the free world of the defensive protection of the atomic weapon without any assurance that that weapon will not be used by the Soviets.

The Soviet Union may talk of disarmament but it has yet to evince the slightest desire to cooperate with other nations in finding practical ways to achieve disarmament. Apparently the Soviet Union would rather excoriate the free world for refusing to accept illusory declarations than cooperate with the free world in working out any realistic program for peace.

Last Friday [March 14], I answered directly and unequivocally the Soviet representative's monstrously false charge that the Unified Command was using bacteriological warfare. If there are epidemics in North Korea and Communist China, the source lies not in any bacteriological warfare employed by the United Nations, but rather in the terrible carnage which has been left in the wake of an aggressive war, the starting and waging of which was aided and abetted by the Soviet Union.

Monstrous falsehoods are usually used to cover up monstrous wrongs. If sanitary measures and medical care are lacking north of the United Nations' lines, it is not the fault of the United Nations, it is the fault of those who are fighting the United Nations and neglecting the health of those in their keeping. The Soviet Union has sent arms for use in the fight against the United Nations. But does it send doctors and medical aid to succor the sick, the wounded, and the dying? The Kremlin does send out alarums to the faithful throughout the world to hold rigged demonstrations where the shedding of crocodile tears is organized in a useless and transparent effort to conceal the aggressors' failures to take care of their own people.

Let me repeat what Secretary Acheson said on March 4:<sup>6</sup>

Our deepest sympathy goes out to all those behind the enemy lines who are sick and suffering. We offer them

the hope that our efforts toward a just armistice will succeed and make it possible for health, as well as peace and security, to be brought to all of Korea. These are the goals of the United Nations for all the people of Korea.

Let there be no mistake about it. There is no bacteriological warfare being used by the United Nations in Korea. The U.N. Command has denied these charges categorically. Moreover, in order to leave no question of the falsity of these charges, the U.S. Government, acting on behalf of the Unified Command, on March 11 requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate these charges and has offered its full aid to the investigation. The International Committee of the Red Cross on March 12 formally offered to investigate these charges, subject to the agreement of both the United Nations Command and the Chinese Communist-North Korean Command, and has requested the cooperation of both sides in conducting the investigation. On March 13, the U.S. Government, on behalf of the Unified Command, unconditionally accepted the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross.<sup>7</sup> The Chinese Communist-North Korean Command has not yet replied to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Soviet representative has put a number of questions to my Government. I will now put to him a question to which I think we are entitled to an answer from his Government. The Soviet Government is on friendly terms with the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities. Those authorities have indicated on many occasions their confidence and trust in the Soviet Government, and would no doubt be influenced by the advice of the Soviet Government. I want to ask Mr. Malik whether his Government will exercise its good offices to prevail on the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to accept the proposal of the International Committee of the Red Cross for an impartial investigation of these charges. I think we are entitled not only to a direct and unequivocal answer but to the active help of the Soviet Government to make this investigation possible. Those who make such charges have a duty to assist and not obstruct impartial, international determination of the truth. I hope the Soviet representative will not reply that an investigation is already being carried out by an "impartial" committee of international free jurists, or any such body of stooges whose report is dictated in advance by the very instigators of the charges.

In closing, I wish to add one further word. I wish to make it clear, on behalf of my Government, that we wish to find means to live in peace and friendship with the Soviet Union as with all other

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 453.

States. My Government joined with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France in urging the establishment of this Commission in the hope that, through working together with the Soviet Union in patient exploration of these complex and immeasurably important problems, we might come to genuinely constructive solutions of the grave issues outstanding between us. The General Assembly endorsed our purpose in establishing this Commission, and we have taken heart from the decision of the Soviet Union to join in the work of the Commission. Frankly, we were disappointed by the attitude expressed by the distinguished representative of the U.S.S.R. at our last meeting. We had expected better. But we will continue to expect better and perhaps, some day, we shall be rewarded. Some day, perhaps, the Soviet representative will make substantive proposals which will be genuinely constructive. We look toward that day.

My Government believes in this Commission and will not be lightly deflected from this Commission's high purposes, for, second only to their freedom, free men cherish peace.

EDITOR'S NOTE: On November 19, 1951, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented to Committee I of the General Assembly a draft resolution establishing a Disarmament Commission (BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 889). A revised tripartite draft was introduced in Committee I on December 13 (BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1952, p. 23). The resolution as adopted by the General Assembly on January 11, 1952, which differs slightly from the revised tripartite draft, is printed below for convenient reference.

U.N. doc. A/L. 25, dated Jan. 12, 1952

The General Assembly,

MOVED by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

DESIRING to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

REAFFIRMING its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

BELIEVING that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

RECOGNIZING that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

NOTING the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments,

1. *Establishes* under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. *Dissolves* the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. *Directs* the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic;

(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;

(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;

(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. *Directs* the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. *Directs* the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. *Directs* the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in subparagraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. *Directs* the Commission to commence its work not

later than thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;

8. *Declares* that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work

of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

## **A Plea for Adequacy of News Distribution and Free Flow of Information**

*Statement by Carroll Binder*

*U.S. Representative in the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information*<sup>1</sup>

We come at long last to that aspect of our task which the informational media and the people of my country have regarded from the first as the most important duty and the greatest opportunity of the subcommission: A consideration of the adequacy of the news available to the peoples of the world and the obstacles to the free flow of information to them.

The informational media and the Government of the United States were instrumental in committing the United Nations to an attempt to lower barriers to the free flow of information between peoples. They saw in this new international organization an opportunity to examine the causes for obstructions to the gathering and transmission of news and a means of removing those obstructions through international compacts.

The U. S. Government was reflecting one of the deepest aspirations of the American people when it took the initiative in committing the United Nations to this high aspiration. For in my country the people are sovereign. Our basic decisions are not made by the executive or legislative branches of our Government but by the 50 or more million citizens who vote in our national elections. Now these citizens cannot make wise decisions unless they have accurate information as to what goes on at home and abroad. They need the fullest information as to the attitude of other peoples and the policies of other governments in order to make wise decisions about what the United States should do and not do. They need to have full information about their own government in order to wisely direct its policies. They are the masters and the government is their servant. When some official

or branch of the government tries to hide information which the people require for correct evaluation of performance or policies he is called to account by the press, speaking for the people.

This has been our law and custom from the beginning of our history. It is one of our greatest strengths. It occasionally is abused, but we consider the harm done by such abuses infinitely easier to sustain than the harm that would be done by limitations upon the right to know and publish. This permits those who oppose or distrust freedom to quote things published in our free press to embarrass us and to persuade the people of other countries that we are not what we should be. You have been treated to many examples of this self-criticism in the course of our discussions. It is hard for people not used to freedom to understand that publication of something damning in American newspapers does not necessarily convict us of the offense with which we are charged.

That, as I have said, is one of the liabilities of freedom to know and publish. We consider such a liability worth bearing because of the priceless assets which come with freedom to know and publish. This freedom is essential to the welfare of all our people—to scholars, artists, scientists, businessmen, trade-unionists, farmers, and people in all walks of life as well as to journalists.

### **U. S. Interest in Free Informational Media**

We attach so much importance to it that we do not believe there can be lasting peace with freedom, justice, and security for all the peoples of the world until all peoples enjoy the right to know, to publish, and to discuss. It was in that spirit that the United States raised freedom of information issues in the United Nations. Perhaps naively, we believed that if other nations

<sup>1</sup> Made before U.N. Subcommittee on Freedom of Information on Mar. 13 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.



looked into them they too would put their trust in free principles and practices.

We also were concerned at the diminution of the quality and quantity of the news available to the peoples of the world, including ourselves. We noted with alarm that while the destinies of the peoples of the world were increasingly interdependent the amount of information about each other was increasingly limited. While the peace and security of one nation was becoming increasingly dependent upon the policies and attitudes of other nations it was increasingly difficult to know exactly what the policies and attitudes of the other nations are.

This is because governments place obstacles in the way of independent newsgatherers and restrict what may be sent abroad. Correspondents are not permitted to obtain reliable information about what goes on in many countries. Censorship prevents them from sending what they believe to be the true character of given policies and the real attitudes of peoples when those estimates are at variance with what governments wish to be published abroad.

It was hoped that by realistic examination of such attitudes and practices in the United Nations ways could be found to increase the volume and quality of news available to the peoples of the world.

It was realized that some governments opposed in principle to freedom and other governments distrustful of freedom would oppose attempts to lower barriers to the free flow of information through international compacts. Thus the problem was approached along two lines. On the governmental level there was an attempt to draft conventions on newsgathering and freedom of information which would find sufficient acceptance to become a part of international law. But it was realized that if this vital problem were left wholly in governmental hands it might not be dealt with as fully and effectively as the situation requires.

So this Subcommittee on Freedom of Information was created for the consideration of freedom of information and of the press issues on a non-governmental level. The Subcommittee was supposed to be composed of experts—men with wide experience in the field of information—who would deal with problems in this field in a more uninhibited and constructive manner than could be expected of some governmental representatives. It was expressly provided that the members of the Subcommittee should not be answerable to their governments. While serving, their modest honorariums are paid not by their governments but by the United Nations. Once elected they cannot be recalled by their governments for they are chosen for stated terms by the United Nations.

It was assumed that such experts assured such independence would realistically examine and report upon the adequacy of the news available to

the peoples of the world. It was assumed they would call attention to obstacles to the free flow of information and thus create an international public opinion which governments could not disregard. It was on that assumption that I accepted election to the Subcommittee. I hoped that at the end of the 3 years I was chosen to serve I could feel that some useful contribution had been made to the profession I have been engaged in for 34 years and to the cause of freedom of information.

### The Subcommittee's Record

I am sorry to say that unless we accomplish a very great deal during the few days of existence still allowed us by the United Nations we shall have embarrassingly little to our credit. We have spent so much time debating what to do and how, that we have given little attention either to the adequacy of the news available to the peoples of the world or to a consideration of ways of removing obstacles to the free flow of information.

We have called attention to the suppression of *La Prensa* and many other independent newspapers in Argentina. We have condemned the jamming of broadcasts by governments interested in preventing their people from learning what goes on abroad.

Aside from those highly creditable but embarrassingly few acts, what can we point to when our labors are concluded and we become a modest paragraph or two in the history of the United Nations? The record will show a regrettable tendency to expend time in discussions about what to do or not to do and to bury ourselves in diversionary activities such as the drafting of a code of ethics which shows little promise of increasing the adequacy of the news available to the peoples of the world or removing obstacles to the free flow of information.

I rejoice that at long last we have gotten around to consideration of that primary task. At least it will enable me to say to my colleagues and countrymen that we did take note of the fact that today there is far less news available to the peoples of the world than at any time since newsgatherers began making the world their beat and that this is an alarming state of affairs calling for far more realistic consideration than it thus far has obtained.

When I think of the countries I could visit and the freedom with which I could report when I first became a foreign correspondent and the freedom with which I could report 30 years ago I am appalled at the limitations and restrictions existing today.

When I first became a foreign correspondent, my colleagues and I could travel and report freely in most parts of the world. We encountered some censorship but usually they were open, that is we took our dispatches to an official who promptly examined it and told us what—if anything—could

not be sent. We felt we were badly put upon by such censorship, which happily were not numerous. But when I think of the restrictions existing today I realize that those were halcyon days, the like of which I shall not see again in my lifetime.

For those who govern large parts of the world no longer permit independent correspondents to visit their countries or so severely circumscribe their movements and contacts that they cannot possibly know what goes on in the country to which they are accredited. Then what they write is censored, often by officials who are inaccessible and who do not let the correspondent know what has been deleted or why. The end result all too often is merely a duplication of the versions put out by the governmental propaganda apparatus. The reader knows only what the government thinks he should know, which in many instances is far from adequate for a correct appraisal of governmental policies or their import for the peace and security of other nations.

Now each government is sovereign in such matters. I recognize the authority of governments to exclude independent correspondents and to censor what is transmitted from their countries. But governments exercising such limitations upon the right to know and to publish should at least be identified as such and their restrictive practices should be appraised from the standpoint of the peoples' right to know. That is what I have conceived to be a primary responsibility of this Subcommittee. I have objected to so much time being spent on other matters because I saw how we were being prevented from tackling this job. I realize that our activities spared restrictive-minded governments from embarrassments but I realize also that it disappointed the great numbers of people who looked to this body of independent experts for something more useful and courageous than that.

Unless one deals with news day in and day out, as I do and as several other members of the Subcommittee do, I doubt if one realizes how appallingly the volume and quality is diminishing. I have tried during my service on the Subcommittee to have this matter periodically examined by the United Nations. You will remember that at our fourth session we proposed that information about obstacles be made available to members of the Subcommittee. The Economic and Social Council adopted resolution 306 F at its eleventh session in response to our request. The history of this resolution is given in document 143 and 143 add. 1, add. 2, and add. 2 correction 1, which are before us. The resolution in question had as its purpose the obtaining of information from press services on "the current status of freedom of information in any part of the world."

Unfortunately, the response to the U.N.'s inquiry has not been good. As stated in Doc. 143/Add. 1, the only material received to date has

been from the Associated Press. This is a comprehensive report which simply tells what is being done in the way of censoring news country by country. It has the merit of being a continuous survey so that changes from year to year can be noted.

Now the U.N. resolution which brought forth this Associated Press report did not provide that the material received should be distributed but only that the United Nations should make an analysis. This I think was an oversight on the part of the Economic and Social Council. I believe this and all other reports should be circulated widely. If this is done it may encourage other news services to submit similar reports. I will recommend formally that such be done by the United Nations.

For our present purpose it is enough that the members of this Subcommittee have this material before them. It tells the deplorable story of newspapers shut down, correspondents restricted and even imprisoned, and censorship and other restrictions being practiced. When the world is surveyed it becomes apparent that independent newsgatherers are barred from all of Communist China and have only limited access to Russia and countries associated with Russia. This you will agree is a very large part of the world and a most important one. How much better would be the prospects for peace with security and justice for all if there could be a free flow of information between the people on the two sides of the iron and bamboo curtains!

#### Criteria of News Adequacy

At this point I shall attempt an analysis of what our terms of reference called the "adequacy" of news. What elements go into a judgment as to whether the public is getting an "adequate" supply of news?

The first criterion I would say is volume. As an editorial writer, I would be greatly handicapped if I were forced to form opinions and write editorials on the basis of fragmentary information. I think the same is true with the general public. This does not mean necessarily that every newspaper or every radio station must carry in every news report a total account of a particular event or trend of events; but in there should be available in some printed form full and "adequate" accounts.

The second element of adequacy is a multiplicity of news sources. I would find myself very much handicapped if I could not read the reports of the Associated Press, International News Service, the United Press, Agence France Presse, Reuters, and Tass as well as those of my newspaper's own correspondents, of the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, each of which has many of its own correspondents overseas. In other words, I

do not form my opinions of the Batista coup in Cuba simply from reading one account of it. I read it many times, in newspapers, in magazines, and in editorials.

This multiplicity of news sources is equally essential, I feel, to the public and countless hundreds of thousands of individuals in my country who form their opinions from this multiple reading of news events.

The third and in some ways the most important quality of adequacy I would say is objectivity. No news is adequate, no matter how great its volume, if it uniformly tells one side of the story. If it is slanted, if it is prejudiced, if it leaves out essential facts and overemphasizes nonessentials for ulterior motives, that news is inadequate. The international press community could do no greater service to their people than to find ways, and employ them, of spreading the gospel of news objectivity.

### Main Weaknesses of Present News Picture

Taking these three criteria of news adequacy as a guide, I have come to the conclusion that there are three main soft spots or weaknesses in the news picture in the world today.

First, there is the area of the globe where journalism is underdeveloped and these are mainly the underdeveloped countries of the world. Let me not be misunderstood. This is not intended as a disparagement of any people or any country. But I think that we must face the fact that in some areas of the globe where illiteracy is high and therefore newspaper readers are relatively few in number, where capital is relatively scarce for investment in costly newspaper plants, where foreign exchange is scarce for the purchase of newsprint, where newspaper and radio technicians are few in number—here not only the people but the government officials operate at an immense handicap in arriving at intelligent decisions.

The people walk in darkness or in shadows and frequently stumble into blind alleys of both domestic and foreign policy. Their opinions are formed directly by rumor and here the rumor monger frequently goes energetically to work and almost as often becomes the equivalent of a war-monger. These are conditions which breed instability of government and promote misunderstandings and frictions between governments.

There are numerous obstacles to the development of journalism, some of which exist in developed countries as well as underdeveloped. I have mentioned technical and economic difficulties. In addition, there are feudal political systems which dislike change and oppose development of government by an informed electorate.

In addition, there are those flagrant instances in which a powerful government, backed up by mob rule deliberately chokes the life from the liv-

ing freedom which exists. Such was the case of the great newspaper *La Prensa* in Argentina. Here freedom existed. It stood against tyranny. In the face of the condemnation of the free people of the globe, a dictatorial regime brought fear and death to that paper's editors and workmen. Such a barrier as this must be broken. I confess I do not know the full and complete answer. But freedom will not be safe so long as *La Prensa* remains a prisoner of a tyrant.

The second principal weakness in our news situation today is the growing tendency to impose restrictions on the international flow of news—restrictions on movement of correspondents, censorship of what they write, and other extreme measures. It raises the most important questions connected with the peace-keeping activities of the nations. How can we in America learn about Egypt, or India, or France, or any other country—and I use these names not to indicate any particular laws that your countries may have passed—if nations continue to build little iron curtains around themselves, how, moreover, can the people and the officials of Lebanon, of India, or of China hope to understand the people and the policy of the United States if little iron curtains continue to drape themselves around the borders of many countries. We want to build our foreign policy on an understanding of other peoples, and I am sure they want to do the same thing with relation to us. But restrictions breed misunderstanding. Restrictions mean isolation. The ultimate in restrictionism arose a little less than a year ago when an American reporter, William Oatis, of the Associated Press, was arrested, held incommunicado, tried without being permitted to consult with his Government or his friends, and thrown into prison, allegedly for spying. William Oatis, as the evidence produced at his trial clearly shows, was doing only the work of a newspaperman. His imprisonment constituted an aggression against the rights of mankind as surely as the attack on Ethiopia, Manchuria, and Korea were attacks on rights of states.

What a fearsome prospect for a journalist if this precedent of repression is allowed to stand. Prison awaits for any reporter who interviews his own embassy officials. A spy charge falls upon him because he is requested by his editors to find the truth about the activities of government officials.

This is intimidation at its worst. It affects not merely news from Czechoslovakia but as a precedent it affects news available in all other countries. It establishes the precedent that reporters must only report news that is dictated by a certain government. Just as Hitler dictated commercial policies and terms of trade in his prewar commerce with dependent countries, this is an effort to dictate the terms of our commerce in free ideas.



The third weak spot in the news picture which needs attention, is the development of traditions of objectivity in news reporting.

I am of the opinion that a tradition of objective fact-finding and fact-reporting is one of the highest attributes of democracy because it is the clearest evidence of the path of government in its own people.

My point is that no society—especially a society mature enough to govern itself—is so lacking in innate intelligence and wisdom that it has to be spoon-fed on a diet of information that somebody else thinks is good for it. The citizens of each of our countries are quite capable of separating for themselves the good facts from the bad. No people is so immature that it cannot stand the shock of the facts. It disparages the intelligence of the

human being to advocate a system of information in which some arbitrator, human censor, or purveyor of doctrine—subject to all the emotions of spite and slander, bribery and corruption, ambition and greed—becomes a filter to sift for the minds of the citizen or inflames him against others or tells falsehoods about his neighbors.

In objectivity, in the straight telling of the facts, lies the quickest solution to the problems which so frequently are laid at the doorstep of newspapermen—the promotion of peace, the promotion of racial and religious friendship, and tolerance and respect for human rights.

These are the primary spheres, the primary problems of information in the world which Ecosoc and the United Nations and the press of the world must struggle with and seek to amend.

## Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

### THIRTY-FIFTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1-15, 1951<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2514  
Transmitted February 5, 1952

I herewith submit report number 35 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 December, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1099-1113 inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

During this period armistice negotiations on Agenda

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Feb. 5. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports in the BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report in the BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report in the BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report in the BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; the 28th and 29th reports in the BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028; the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; and the 34th report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430.

Item three continued in Sub-Committee meetings. On 3 December the Communist side introduced two proposals: "(6) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext. (7) In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of Paragraph (6), both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean War to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the Demilitarized Zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the Joint Armistice Commission the result of inspection."

Communist proposal (6) above would result in the evacuation of United Nations Command Forces from Korea by attrition. The United Nations Command holds that it has the right to maintain its forces in Korea during the period of the military armistice and pending a settlement at higher level.

Communist proposal (7) shows the clear intent to confine the activities of the Military Armistice Commission to the Demilitarized Zone only. Comparable United Nations Command proposals were as follows:

"4. A. Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission which shall be responsible for supervising the execution of and adherence to the whole armistice agreement. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with, and assisted by, observer teams which shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission only. The observer teams shall be composed of representatives of nations neutral in the Korean War, such nations to be mutually agreed to by both sides.

"B. Observation outside the Demilitarized Zone will be performed only by neutral observer teams. Observation within the Demilitarized Zone may be performed by neu-

tral teams, by joint teams selected by the Military Armistice Commission, or by the Military Armistice Commission itself.

"C. Neutral observer teams shall be located at such land, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centres as are mutually agreed to by both sides. These observer teams shall be permitted freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea and each side shall afford these teams full assistance in the execution of the duties assigned them by the Armistice Commission. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance and observation and photographic flights as are mutually agreed to by both sides will be performed by neutral teams.

"5. Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities shall not be permitted."

Toward the close of the period there were four basic points of disagreement concerning Agenda Item three:

A. No increase in present strength levels and equipment stocks versus no introduction of personnel and equipment under any pretext.

B. Rehabilitation of facilities, particularly airfields.

C. Status of offshore islands.

D. Relationship of neutral observer teams to Military Armistice Commission.

Item four consists of "arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war". From the 4th to the 10th of December the United Nations Command Delegation daily urged that a separate sub-Delegation be designated to discuss Item four. This proposal was made by the United Nations Command Delegation for the sole purpose of expediting the negotiations and in view of the humanitarian features of prisoner of war matters. Finally, on 11 December, after a week's time had been wasted, the Communists agreed to initiate discussions. At the outset of these discussions the United Nations Command made, and has made daily since then, two fundamental and logical proposals: namely, that information on prisoners of war be exchanged and that representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to visit prisoner of war camps. Both of these reasonable and humanitarian proposals, designed to alleviate the suffering of prisoners and their families, were callously and summarily rejected by the Communists. The United Nations Command long ago agreed to observe the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war and has done so. Names of prisoners have been sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross. International Committee of the Red Cross representatives regularly visit United Nations Command prisoner of war camps. The enemy, in complete disregard of the custom and usage of civilized society, has refused up to period covered by this report to exchange information on prisoners.

There were few significant military developments and no major changes in troop dispositions along the line of contact during the period. Both sides continued routine reconnaissance patrolling. The enemy remained alert, and appeared determined to intercept all United Nations Command patrols. He also made numerous small scale probing attacks, all of which were promptly repulsed.

On the western front, extending northeastward about fifty miles from Hungwang to the vicinity of Chungdong, small, scattered patrol clashes occurred on the sector between Pungli and Kigong, to the west of Sangnyong, and to the south of Sagimak. Usually, upon establishing the presence of the enemy, the United Nations Command patrols returned to their bases after a short skirmish. During the period, the 39th Chinese Communist Forces Army relieved the 47th Chinese Communist Forces Army in the Sangnyong area, apparently in conformity to the

enemy's long established policy for the periodic relief of units on the line of contact.

Contacts were much more frequent and somewhat more intensive on the central and eastern fronts, and hostile small scale probing efforts were virtually continuous. The bulk of these skirmishes were concentrated in the vicinity of Kumsong on the central front, and in the vicinity of Mulguji, Sohul, and Cemyon on the eastern front. The enemy supported his forces with moderate volumes of artillery and mortar fire in all sectors.

There was evidence of continued improvement in the organization and development of hostile defences, but the enemy displayed little interest in offensive warfare. The volume of traffic sighted in the enemy rear areas, however, indicates a continued effort to maintain full combat capacity as regards logistic support; and the steady flow of hostile replacements to depleted units demonstrates the enemy intention to maintain a strong military potential in Korea.

Strong United Nations Command security elements scored significant successes against guerrillas during the current period. The bulk of the 7500 to 10,000 bandits and Communist dominated partisans operating in the Republic of Korea have long been concentrated in the more inaccessible mountain regions in the extreme southwest of the Korean peninsula. Although not a serious impediment to logistic or frontline military operations, these forces have constituted a serious problem to internal administration, and are extremely prejudicial to the maintenance of civil order. Because of a recent flare up in the activity of these bands, it was decided to launch a determined military effort to eliminate the guerrilla menace. Accordingly, strong Republic of Korea forces were deployed into southwestern Korea to seek out and destroy all dissident elements. To date, this effort has been very successful. From 1 to 12 December, 2500 were killed or captured. Increasing numbers of guerrillas are surrendering and the remainder have retreated farther into the mountains to avoid destruction.

Minor guerrilla groups were contacted occasionally in rear areas, in the vicinity of the front lines, near the east coast. The chief concern of these small bands has been to avoid United Nations Command security elements which were seeking them out. They have not constituted a menace to United Nations Command military operations.

The clear, cold weather of early December favored United Nations Command Naval forces in exerting increased pressure on the enemy. Up and down the length of the North Korean coasts the ships and planes of the fleet methodically and accurately chopped up enemy rail and highway routes with record quantities of high explosive missiles. Close support by Naval gunfire and air attack was also stepped up in highly effective blows at enemy personnel and weapons. The Communists resisted strongly with heavy return fire from their coast artillery and anti-aircraft batteries; and in a surprise night amphibious invasion they succeeded in driving off the Korean garrison to seize the island of Taewha-Do in the Bay of Korea. Several of their troop laden junks were sunk by the defending British destroyer *Cockade* which was itself slightly damaged by enemy gunfire. United Nations Command Marine Commandos retaliated with a series of harassing raids deep behind enemy lines near Songjin on the northeast Korean coast.

Naval aircraft reported several brushes with Communist jet fighters and thirteen MIG-15's were sighted over Wonsan. Blockading ships and aircraft sank or damaged numerous junks and sampans to deprive the enemy of sea-borne supplies. Heavy bombardments of North Korean coastal supply hubs were made at frequent intervals as United Nations Command Naval and Marine forces intensified their attacks throughout the period.

The tentative agreements on a cease fire line have had no effect on the United Nations Command air operation. Aircraft of Far East Air Forces and attached United Nations Command units continued to search out and destroy targets throughout North Korea. An aver-

age of 885 sorties per day were flown in the execution of this mission.

In close support, location and destruction of troublesome front line enemy artillery has been emphasized during daylight operations. More than 230 of these positions have been wiped out or heavily damaged in the past two weeks. At night B-29 medium bombers supported United Nations Command ground forces by attacking enemy positions and troop concentrations beyond the range of artillery.

The heavy impact of the rail interdiction programme is now more apparent. Along some sections of the open lines the cumulative damage caused by United Nations Command fighter bombers exceeds the recovery and repair capability of the enemy labour pool. In this respect the main line from Pyongyang south to Sariwon has been abandoned and the main West coast line from Sinanju to Sukchon is only occasionally serviceable. Some shuttle traffic is flowing south of Sinanju but numerous short hauls with multiple loading and unloading under cover of darkness are required in this operation. The important rail bridges at Sinanju, Songchon, and Sunchon were again knocked out by our night flying medium bombers.

Night intruder aircraft, aided by moonlight, have destroyed or damaged fifty locomotives in the past fifteen nights. Target of opportunity strikes by armed reconnaissance, interdiction, and night intruder aircraft are estimated to have accounted for 550 enemy troops killed, 1000 store houses destroyed and damaged, 560 rail cars destroyed and damaged, and 2550 vehicles destroyed as well as many other miscellaneous targets.

Enemy opposition to deep penetration by United Nations Command aircraft is increasing in intensity. In the area north and west of Pyongyang large numbers of MIG-15 fighters were seen by the United Nations Command pilots whenever the weather was favourable for flying. During the period, 2350 enemy jet aircraft were observed; United Nations Command fighters shot down twenty-nine and damaged at least twenty-eight more. The day of heaviest activity was 5 December when Far East Air Forces aircraft sighted 310 MIG-15's. Night flying aircraft were frequently intercepted and fired at by Communist night fighters, some of which were reported as jet types. Observed tactics indicated that ground controlled radar and searchlights were used in these interceptions. United Nations Command aircraft suffered no losses and very little damage from these attacks. Airdromes within North Korea have been slow to recover from the heavy bombing attacks delivered throughout November. These targets remained high on the priority list but required less effort to keep them in an unserviceable status. Throughout the period the only runway in North Korea which became temporarily serviceable for jet fighter operation was Uiju.

Aircraft of the Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command flew 3,060 sorties to transport 10,130 tons in support of the Korean operation. Included in this total were 42,700 passengers and 3,000 medical evacuees.

Enemy aircraft were detected over South Korea on four occasions. There were also two ineffective air attacks on friendly islands north of the bomb line.

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts devoted particular attention to rapid dissemination of news reports concerning discussion of Armistice Agenda Items three and four, and urged support for United Nations efforts to bring hostilities to an early conclusion. The significance of Communist delaying tactics, which consumed day after day in fruitless quibbling over irrelevant issues, was made clear to soldiers and civilians alike. Through United Nations Command media, the soldiers of the Communist Armies were forcefully reminded of the relentless increase in their casualty lists while the Communist Delegates prolong the war with persistent evasion of inquiries and refusal to clarify vague and ambiguous proposals.

Continued action is being taken by the United Nations Command to import supplies and equipment for relief purposes as well as for stimulation of Korean industry.

Power facilities and coal mines are being rehabilitated and placed in operation. Further, we are encouraging the Republic of Korea to take all steps possible toward self-rehabilitation and the establishment of a sound, viable economy.

General health conditions throughout South Korea are reported relatively good. No wide-spread outbreaks of respiratory diseases have been reported to date. The prospects of preventing impaired health due to lack of shelter appears good. The South Koreans have intensified construction of shelters from rough timber and mud. In many cases, tents have been provided and winterized. Warm floors are being constructed in tents and buildings from any material available and a great deal of ingenuity has been shown in improvising winter comforts. It is expected that these improvements together with houses being built with lumber supplied through the civil assistance programme will provide adequately for the majority of the needy population.

With the exception of a relatively large number of cases of dysentery reported from Kangwon-Do Province, the reported incidence of communicable diseases is quite low. Vaccines are being distributed according to schedule and the immunization programme is in full swing in all provinces under United Nations Command control with the exception of Cholla-Pukto.

For the period 25 June 1950 to 24 November 1951 the total estimated dollar value of supplies and equipment programmed under the United Nations Command programme for civilian relief and economic aid to Korea, exclusive of supplies delivered for common military and civilian use—bridges, rolling stock, road building equipment, and similar items—is \$187,673,578 of which supplies and equipment worth \$85,819,824 have been delivered. In this total is included \$168,140,631 programmed out of United States appropriated funds, of which \$69,428,425 worth of supplies and equipment has been delivered. Also included in the total are contributions from other United Nations members and voluntary relief agencies with an estimated dollar value of \$19,532,947, of which supplies worth an estimated \$16,319,399 have been delivered.

## St. Lawrence Seaway Applications

*[Released to the press March 4]*

The Department of State announced on March 4 that a group of U.S. officials, headed by Jack Gorrie, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, will go to Ottawa on March 6 for the purpose of making an exploratory examination of subjects relating to the references of applications to the International Joint Commission for approval of the St. Lawrence Project.

The U.S. officials are members of an inter-agency committee established to consider with the Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project the steps to be taken in proceeding with the reference of applications to the Commission, in connection with the all-Canadian Seaway, should that be necessary. N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Canadian Cabinet, is Chairman of the Canadian Committee.

The conferences were provided for in an exchange of notes on January 11, 1952, between Secretary Acheson and H. H. Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 234.



## The United States in the United Nations

[March 15-March 27, 1952]

### Security Council

*The Disarmament Commission*—At the March 19 meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the U.S. representative, Benjamin V. Cohen, spoke on the U.S. draft plan of work.

Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) accused the U.S. representative of slandering the U.S.S.R. as a means of concealing the U.S. Government's refusal to reduce armaments and prohibit the atomic weapon. He reiterated the proposals made by the Soviet Union during the sixth session of the General Assembly, and introduced a plan of work for the Commission embodying these proposals.

Mr. Malik concluded by once again accusing the United States of using bacteriological weapons and refusing to condemn this criminal method of warfare. He insisted that the Disarmament Commission must consider this question, condemn the users of such weapons, and call them to account.

At the March 20 meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the representatives of China, the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey expressed their concern over, and disapproval of, the Soviet Union's tactics of diverting the Commission's attention from its work through introducing false charges that the United States had employed bacteriological warfare in Korea. Mr. Tsiang (China) pointed out that the Chinese Communists had killed many physicians and nurses and had forced many others to leave the country; that there was famine in China; consequently, that it was natural that there should be epidemics which affected not merely North Korea but other areas in China.

Mr. Kyrrou (Greece) strongly supported the U.S. plan of work as objective, complete, and enabling any member of the Commission to raise any relevant point. He was sure that all the subjects in the U.S.S.R. plan fitted perfectly into the U.S. plan. He concluded by pointing out that the authority of the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate charges of bacteriological warfare used by the Unified Command in Korea had been recognized by the Red Cross societies of Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and Bulgaria which had filed "indignant" protests with the International Committee.

Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) insisted that he had answered the U.S. representative's request that the Soviet Union exercise its good offices to bring about an impartial investigation of alleged bacteriological warfare use in Korea, through calling in the Disarmament Commission to study banning the use of bacteriological weapons and calling to account those who violated such ban.

Mr. Cohen (U.S.) and Mr. Moch (France) emphasized that Mr. Malik once again had refused to answer the question whether the U.S.S.R. would exercise its good offices to bring about Chinese Communist-North Korean acceptance of the International Committee of the Red Cross offer to investigate these charges. Mr. Moch regretted the Soviet representative's activities in making serious accusations without a shadow of proof.

On March 26 the representatives of Chile, the United Kingdom, Brazil, France, and Canada spoke to deplore the U.S.S.R.'s raising obvious false allegations of bacteriological warfare use in the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with the normal Communist technique of the "big lie" and to divert attention from epidemics which apparently existed in North Korea and North China.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), after reminding the Commission that the failure of the potato crop in Czechoslovakia some time ago had led to an elaborate propaganda campaign that the United States had brought about such failure by dropping potato bugs from airplanes, hoped that Mr. Malik had completed reading out his instructions received from Moscow and would now come to the conclusion that he had done his duty and would allow the Commission to proceed with its proper work. As for the Soviet Union's plan of work, while it was agreed that Mr. Vyshinsky's proposals made in the Political Committee of the General Assembly's sixth session should be considered in the Commission, there was no reason for the Commission to commit itself in advance to accept these proposals by adopting the Soviet plan of work which in effect required such acceptance. If the Commission would take the Soviet plan of work as drafted, Mr. Malik would then say all members were committed in principle to accept the Soviet plan. If the Commission declined to walk into this trap, Mr. Malik would then say that the Com-

mission was refusing in advance even to consider the Soviet proposals and rejecting outright prohibiting atomic weapons or reducing armaments and armed forces. However, what the Commission might do would be to say whether some compromise might be arrived at between the Soviet Union plan of work and that submitted by the United States.

Mr. Teixeira Soares (Brazil) agreed with Sir Gladwyn Jebb's views regarding the Soviet work plan but supported the U.S. plan of work as enabling the Commission to consider all necessary questions without committing members to a predetermined course of action.

Mr. Moch (France) asked the representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. whether they would agree that the Commission should not vote on the two plans as a whole from the outset but take a first section only. He suggested that this first section should consist of fusing parts A and B of the U.S. plan of work, enabling simultaneous or alternate discussion of the question of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification and the question of methods of calculated and fixing overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments.

The Chairman, Mr. Johnson of Canada, accused the Soviet representative of introducing into the Disarmament Commission a false note which disappointed all who looked to the Commission for some positive and constructive results.

On March 26 the Disarmament Commission met both morning and afternoon. The Soviet representative accused the United States of attempting merely to collect information by stages, beginning with the least essential weapons, in order to prevent prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments as well as preventing disclosing information on atomic and other mass destruction weapons. He bitterly attacked the concept of disclosure by stages, and charged that the U.N. atomic energy control plan was designed to enable the "aggressive bloc" to interfere in the internal affairs and economic life of the U.S.S.R. and other states. Once more, Mr. Malik devoted the major portion of his speech to the Communist-propaganda charge of bacteriological warfare in Korea.

He stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross, was not an international organization but a Swiss national group which could not be expected to act objectively and impartially and that U.S. insistence that this Red Cross Committee investigate the bacteriological warfare charges was an attempt to prevent the Disarmament Commission, as a competent organ of the United Nations, from taking up the question.

Ambassador Cohen, speaking for the United States, said the Soviet representative had presented a wilderness of half-truths and total lies in which there was one central fact: The Soviet Union refused to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct an impartial investigation in the bacteriological warfare charges.

As for the work plan, the United States would have no objection to concurrent consideration of paragraphs A and B of the draft U.S. plan of work, as suggested the previous day by the French representative. However, Mr. Cohen hoped that the Commission could agree at the outset on a whole work plan so that it could see where the various proposals fitted in.

Mr. Moch (France) introduced a new draft plan, which he believed contained all the elements of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. plans in neutral form, hoping that the first two paragraphs could be discussed concurrently in the first stages of the Commission's work, either jointly, or alternately, by the Commission or simultaneously by its working committees. The French plan called for (1) disclosure and verification of all armaments and all armed forces; (2) regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including elimination of atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction and limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and armed forces, together with the controls necessary to insure these objectives; (3) the procedures and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament program.

The Soviet representative said he would study the French plan with care but believed that there did not seem to be much difference between this and the U.S. plan, and repeated that the Commission would only be able to carry out its obligations if it conducted its business on the basis of the Soviet plan.

#### **Economic and Social Council**

*Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press*—The fifth and final session of the Subcommission ended on March 21. It recommended to the Economic and Social Council the continuance of a special U.N. body to deal with freedom of information questions. The terms of reference would be the same as the old subcommission but its membership would be altered to assure a truly professional membership of persons active in journalism, radio, or other information media.

Other actions by the Subcommission were the adoption of recommendations for agenda items dealing with freedom of information for future sessions of the Economic and Social Council; a condemnation of the infringement of the freedom of the press and information by the Argentine Government in closing of *La Prensa*; recommendations that Ecosoc open for signature the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction ("Newsgathering" Convention) and the Convention on Freedom of Information. It also requested Unesco to continue its efforts to encourage the establishment of independent domestic information agencies and of an International Institute of the Press and Information on a universal basis and requested the General Assembly that it urge members to give the widest dissemination to U.N. resolutions.

## Concern Expressed Over Trade Restrictions Of Defense Production Act

[Released to the press March 11]

*Following is the text of a letter dated March 10, 1952, from Secretary Acheson to Senator Burnet R. Maybank, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee:*

In view of the fact that your committee is now considering a bill to extend the Defense Production Act, it occurred to me that it might be useful to review the developments with regard to Section 104 of the Act which have taken place since the fall of 1951, when last the Department had an opportunity to testify on the subject. These developments have a particular bearing on your Committee's consideration of S. 2645 as proposed to be amended by Senator Ives, which would extend the terminal date of Section 104 from June 30, 1952 to June 30, 1954.

As you know, the Department of State was concerned from the very beginning over the effects which Section 104 was bound to have on the ability of friendly foreign countries to earn the dollars they need to put themselves on a self-supporting basis. It was foreseen that these restrictions would prevent them from earning considerable sums, running into the millions of dollars, and that they would be profoundly discouraged by this particular experience in any further efforts to build up their export industries. As we saw the problem then, we were simply putting these countries in a position in which they would need even more financial help to carry their share of the defense burden. We felt also that, in the end, the measures were bound to hurt our own exports of agricultural products as the affected countries acquired fewer dollars with which to buy our products.

We felt even greater concern at the broader implications of these restrictions. Section 104 requires the United States to take action contrary to the basic provisions of agreements under the Trade Agreements Act to which the United States is a party, and to take action contrary to the objectives of the Mutual Security Act. Apart from the immediate effects of the particular measure, inconsistencies of this sort tend to undermine the basis on which our position of leadership rests, by raising fundamental doubts in the minds of

the other countries of the free world as to our sense of responsibility and the nature of our goals.

The damage which these restrictions have done is aggravated by the fact that the provisions involved embody principles on which the United States has always put great store. These principles are aimed at developing the kind of trading system among the friendly countries of the world in which businessmen could buy and sell their goods with a minimum of governmental interference in their activities. This attitude towards quotas and other governmental restrictions on trade is essential if private enterprise is to maintain its place in the conduct of international trade.

It is against that general background that we have appraised the developments in the international field since last summer which have occurred as a result of Section 104. These developments have convinced me that the Department's original estimate of the effect of Section 104 on other countries, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of understatement. It is clear now that Canada and Western Europe have been profoundly disturbed by the implications of these restrictions. It is not so much the immediate dollar loss involved in these restrictions which concerns them, though that is serious enough for some of them. Much more important is the uncertainty which these measures have created, uncertainty as to the direction in which the United States proposes to move in the field of trade policy. Our friends in Europe and elsewhere, whether they produce cheese or not, have begun to wonder whether the imposition of these restrictions means that the United States proposes to revert to a policy of raising trade barriers, even though the policy may weaken the collective economic strength of the free world.

This deep concern on the part of Canada and Western Europe has been evident in a number of ways. Last October, at Geneva, nine Contracting Parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade formally protested against our restrictions under Section 104, charging this Government was acting inconsistently with its trade-agreement undertakings. The countries filing the complaint were The Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, New Zea-



#### Section 104 of Defense Production Act

"Sec. 104. Import controls of fats and oils (including oil-bearing materials, fatty acids, and soap and soap powder, but excluding petroleum and petroleum products and coconuts and coconut products), peanuts, butter, cheese and other dairy products, and rice and rice products are necessary for the protection of the essential security interests and economy of the United States in the existing emergency in international relations, and no imports of any such commodity or product shall be admitted to the United States until after June 30, 1952, which the Secretary of Agriculture determines would (a) impair or reduce the domestic production of any such commodity or product below present production levels, or below such higher levels as the Secretary of Agriculture may deem necessary in view of domestic and international conditions, or (b) interfere with the orderly domestic storing and marketing of any such commodity or product, or (c) result in any unnecessary burden or expenditures under any Government price support program. The President shall exercise the authority and powers conferred by this section."

land, Norway, Australia, France, Canada, and Finland. The filing of a complaint of this sort is not done lightly; it is a fairly important political step on the part of any government. In this case, the Contracting Parties concluded that our action was in fact inconsistent with the General Agreement. They went on to counsel the countries affected to withhold any offsetting actions on their part for the time being until it was clearer what steps the United States Government might take to rectify the situation.

There have been at least two developments since that meeting which are worth noting. The Dutch Government has announced that it is consulting with its partners in the Benelux Union, Belgium and Luxembourg, on increasing its duties against American goods, a step which it may eventually be compelled to take because of the reduction in the amount of dollars it has available to buy dollar goods. Meanwhile, the Italian Government has filed a long and carefully drafted memorandum with the Department describing the cumulative effect of recent United States import measures upon the Italian economy.

I should like to quote two paragraphs from the Italian memorandum, since it sets out succinctly the nature of the concern which other countries have felt as a result of our cheese restrictions.

Finally, there are the political and psychological effects to be considered. These can hardly be overestimated. What is at stake is the vast store of good will and gratitude which exists in Italy and other friendly countries as a result of the generous post-war American aid, and of Marshall Plan aid in particular. For, most segments of Italian public opinion are altogether at a loss to understand how the vast amount of help poured into Italy during the past three years, with the express purpose of restoring the stability of both the domestic and the international economy of the nation, can be reconciled with the recent restrictions that have hit vital sectors of the Italian

economy. The very fact that these restrictions are but incidental and almost trivial within the over-all context of U. S. policies, is bound to intensify their adverse impact. This is because they appear to involve the mistaken idea that, while American policies are liberal and indeed generous at their over-all level, they acquire an altogether different connotation as soon as the protection of special interests is concerned.

This implication, no matter how unwarranted, plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by communist propaganda in Europe. As it is known, the communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while barring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the communist minority for its own ends—despite the constant emphasis of the Italian Government on the true facts.

Italy's sensitivity to the possibilities which these cheese restrictions have created for communist propaganda is due in part to the fact that Southern Italy has been particularly hard hit by the restrictions. As you know, the widespread poverty and unemployment in Southern Italy have created a fertile ground for communist agitators. Before Section 104 was enacted, one of the bright spots in the economy of Southern Italy was a growing export trade in cheese. Pecorino, romano, and other pungent cheeses of the area were coming to the United States in growing volume, giving employment to Southern Italy, and giving dollars to the Italian economy. Shortly after Section 104 put a halt to this development, we received reports out of Southern Italy that agents of the Soviet Government were ostentatiously making bids for various agricultural products of the same area, with obvious propaganda effect.

Of course, in any balanced appraisal of the desirability of Section 104, one has to take into account not only its effects upon our foreign policy objectives, but also upon our domestic agriculture. On this score, representatives of the Department of Agriculture have repeatedly stated their considered judgment that the measure hurts rather than helps American agriculture. They have also stated it as their conclusion that Section 104 is unnecessary for the protection of domestic agriculture, and, in the end, is bound to do it real injury. This Department is in agreement with these conclusions. Other provisions of the law, such as Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the escape clauses of the Trade Agreements Act, provide the means whereby American agriculture can be protected in any individual cases of injury. Moreover, American agriculture relies heavily upon foreign markets for the sale of its products. In 1950, for example, American farmers sold 2.9 billion dollars of their products overseas, to foreign consumers they never saw and often never knew were their customers. On the other hand, American imports of agricultural

products of the type we grow at home amounted to about 1.8 billion dollars. Even some of the products that Section 104 aims at protecting have regularly been on an export basis. In 1950, we sold the world 87 million dollars of dairy products, and imported only 34 million dollars worth of such products.

In his own protection, the American farmer must live in a world in which nations stand ready to receive the products of one another and in which nations are willing and have the financial means to buy the products of one another. So far as international trade is concerned, this is the surest protection that can be provided the American farmer.

In sum, therefore, it appears to this Department that our major foreign policy objectives and our interest in the protection of the American farmer alike require that the terminal date of Section 104 should not be extended.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Appointment of Officers

Gerald A. Drew as Director General of the Foreign Service, effective March 21.

Joseph B. Phillips as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective March 6.

### Public Safety Specialist for Germany Named

The Department of State announced on March 20 that William J. Roach, Superintendent of Police, Waterbury, Conn., will participate in a public-safety project administered by the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

During this 3-month stay, Mr. Roach will work with German police forces, advising them on organization and administration. These German groups have requested assistance in the departments of criminal investigation and traffic control. To enable him to carry out this proposed assignment, he has been awarded a grant under the Department of State's exchange of persons program.

### Current U.N. Documents—Continued from p. 500

**Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X).** Communication received from the World Federation of Trade Unions. E/2154, February 27, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo.

### General Assembly

**Question of South West Africa.** Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2066, January 16, 1952. 16 pp. mimeo.

**Economic and Financial Provisions in Respect of Eritrea Arising Out of Paragraph 19 of Annex XIV of the Treaty of Peace With Italy.** A/2077, January 24, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo.

**Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter II).** Report of the Second Committee. A/2069, January 24, 1952. 13 pp. mimeo.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 17-22, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (\*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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*208	3/20	L'Heureux: Naturalization
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210	3/21	Round-the-clock broadcasting by RIAS
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211	3/21	Who assistance to N. Korea
213	3/21	Acheson: Japan peace treaty
214	3/21	Acheson: Saar question
215	3/22	Sebald: Japan, asset to free world
†216	3/21	Tewksbury: resignation (rewrite)
217	3/21	Drew: Director General of F.S. (rewrite)

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